Möglichkeiten für eine präventive und breitenwirksame Verbraucherberatung durch die Verbraucherzentralen

Journal of Consumer Policy - Der Beitrag stellt einen Vorschlag über Möglichkeiten der Erweiterung der Rechtsberatung durch die Verbraucherzentralen in Richtung auf eine Erhöhung von...     

Trade and the Environment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity

In this paper, we derive a new effect of trade liberalization on the quality of the environment. We show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms, the aggregate volume of emissions is influenced by a reallocation effect resulting from an increase in the relative size of more productive firms. The relative importance of this reallocation effect and the scale effect well‐known from the literature is affected by the emission intensity at the firm level. Domestic emissions decrease as a result of a unilateral tariff reduction if and only if firm‐specific emission intensity decreases strongly with increasing firm productivity. As a result of the induced change in foreign emissions, domestic pollution can increase even if domestic emissions decrease.     

Open‐shop unions and product market competition

Abstract Evidence on the effect of product market competition on unionized wages is mixed. In this paper we show theoretically that the result may reflect genuine heterogeneity in the response of union wages to product market conditions. For low levels of unionization, union bargaining power may actually be enhanced by market competition, as firms have more to lose when there is a strike. Using recent data from the UK, we explore interactions between the level of industry competition and unionization, and find supporting evidence for this hypothesis.     

Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist

We show that a monopolistic final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under the former situation. We also show that licensing by the monopolist is profitable under both quantity and price competition, and the incentive for licensing is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Our qualitative results hold even with decentralized unions.      

Tari–tax reforms and market access

Reducing taris and increasing consumption taxes is a standard IMF advice to countries that want to open up their economy without hurting government finances. Indeed, theoretical analysis of such a tari–tax reform shows an unambiguous increase in welfare and government revenues. The present paper examines whether the country that implements such a reform ends up opening up its markets to international trade, i.e. whether its market access improves. It is shown that this is not necessarily so. We also show that, comparing to the reform of only taris, the tari–tax reform is a less efficient proposal to follow both as far as it concerns market access and welfare.