Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game

We study a “reverse” ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie. The game ends if the responder accepts an offer, or if, following a rejection, the proposer decides not to make a better offer. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium gives the proposer the minimum possible payoff. Nevertheless, the experimental results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, although proposers generally receive slightly less than half of the surplus.We use the reverse ultimatum game to study deadlines experimentally. With a deadline, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the proposer gets the entire surplus.Deadlines are used strategically to influence the outcome, and agreements are reached near the deadline. Strategic considerations are evident in the differences in observed behavior between the deadline and no deadline conditions, even though agreements are substantially less extreme than predicted by perfect equilibrium.     

Price adjustment strategy under conditions of high inflation: An empirical examination

Price adjustment strategy is a central problem to businesses operating under conditions of high inflation. Three different approaches to the problem are presented and some of their implications tested empirically by means of a unique data set. The empirical observations do not support any of the three traditional approaches.     

An analysis of the automatic stabilizers associated with taxes and transfer payments

This paper examines the question of the stability of automatic stabilizers in the United States. Based on a statistical test suggested by Brown, Durbin and Evans, the analysis concludes that the magnitude of automatic stabilization of economic activity afforded by personal tax receipts has remained virtually invariant over the period 1939–86. The automatic stabilization effectiveness of transfer payments, however, had increased, since 1964. This is attributed to the implementation of various Great Society programmes beginning in 1964.     

Productivity Change,Technical Progress,and Efficiency Improvement in Telecommunications

Implementation of incentive regulation intelecommunications requires the accurate measurementof the change in productivity. An approach isintroduced that not only provides a measure of thechange in productivity but also allows for adecomposition into two mutually exclusive andexhaustive components – changes in technicalefficiency over time and shifts in technology overtime. Using annual data on four output measures andsix input measures for the period 1988 to 1998 fornineteen individual local exchange carriers, theresults indicate that productivity increased by about5.0 percent per year. This growth is due primarily toinnovation rather than improvements in efficiency. Ofthe nineteen LECs in the sample, thirteen wereoperating efficiently throughout the entire 1988–1998period. Of the remaining six, two showed a slightimprovement in efficiency while the efficiency of fourdeclined. In the aggregate, however, there wasvirtually no change in efficiency. Finally, acomparison is made between two methods of estimatingthe change in productivity. The conventional growthaccounting approach yields a lower estimate of therate of change in productivity than does the Malmquistindex approach. The difference between theseestimates is interpreted as the lower bound of thebias associated with the conventional growthaccounting approach to measuring the growth inproductivity.     

What's in a name? Anonymity and social distance in dictator and ultimatum games

The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants, yet many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete familiarity. When we are involved in interactive situations in the field, we usually have some clues concerning the characteristics of others; however, in some environments (such as e-commerce) these clues may not be very substantial. How will people respond to varying degrees of anonymity and social distance? We consider the effect of one form of social distance on behavior by comparing the standard procedure of playing dictator and ultimatum games with the same games played by participants who knew the family name of their counterparts. When these names were revealed, dictators allocated a significantly larger portion of the pie. However, this information had no significant effect on the offers in the ultimatum game, as it appears that strategic considerations crowd out impulses toward generosity or charity.     

The impact of technical change on the aggregate production function

This study endeavours to look at both disembodied technical progress and embodied technical progress in the capital stock and in the labour force in the United States over the period 1947–80. The results suggest that disembodied technical progress has been about 3% per year, embodied technical progress in the capital stock is approximately 3–4% per year and educational attainment significantly enhances labour productivity. Finally, when the issue of structural stability of the underlying production relationship is addressed, the period 1971–80 gives rise to some inconsistency.     

Telecommunications in the United States and Changing Productive Efficiency

The issue explored is whether incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry in the United States has resulted in an increase in productive efficiency. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, the methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency is reviewed. An approach is introduced that not only provides a measure of the change in productivity but also allows for a decomposition into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive components—changes in technical efficiency over time and shifts in technology over time. Using annual data on four output measures and six input measures for the period 1988–1999 for nineteen individual local exchange carriers, the results indicate that productivity increased by about 4.9% per year. This growth is due primarily to innovation rather than improvements in efficiency. Of the 19 LECs in the sample, 12 were operating efficiently throughout the entire 1988–1999 period. Of the remaining seven, three showed a slight improvement in efficiency while the efficiency of four declined. In the aggregate, however, there was virtually no change in efficiency.     

A Note on Measuring the Productivity Offset for Regulatory Purposes

Calculation of the productivity offset or the X-factor used in setting price caps has a fundamental flaw when it is based on conventional growth accounting total factor productivity analysis. The problem is discussed in the context of incentive regulation used by the Federal Communications Commission in the United States and the appropriate correction is indicated. An example of the problem and its correction, using the access charge for interstate service in telecommunications, is provided. The correction shows that the appropriate X-factor is 12 percent greater than that based on conventional growth accounting total factor productivity analysis.     

Redistributing the energy tax burden in the Philippines

This paper uses an aggregate modelling approach to assess the impacts of a redistribution of the taxes and duties that currently exist on crude oil and refined petroleum products on the Philippine economy. The approach used in the analysis consists of a general equilibrium model composed of fourteen producing sectors, fifteen consuming sectors, three household categories classified by income and a government. The effects of replacing the taxes and duties on crude oil and refined petroleum products with a more broad based tax on manufacturing and service sectors output on prices and quantities are examined. The results are revealing. For example, the consequences of redistributing the tax burden away from petroleum products to the manufacturing and service sectors of the Philippine economy will be an increase in output by all producing sectors of about 3.5 percent or about 2.4 hundred billion Philippine pesos, a rise in the consumption of goods and services by about 6.1 percent or 1.6 hundred billion Philippine pesos, a rise in total utility by 6.9 or 1.9 hundred billion Philippine pesos, and virtually no change in tax revenue for the government. When subjected to a sensitivity analysis, the results are reasonably robust with regard to the assumption of the values of the substitution elasticities. That is, while the model's equilibrium values do vary in response to different assumptions of the values of these elasticities, the fluctuations are not so enormous to suggest that the model is unrealistically sensitive to these parameters.Notation Y _j Total production in sectorj (j=1, 2, ..., 14) - CD _j Consumer demand for productj - GE _j Government endowment of productj - UM _j Imports of productj - _LRAS_jl RAS balanced input-output intermediate demands - GD _j Government demand for productj - INV _j Investment in sectorj - UX _j Exports of productj - SL _c Supply of labor by householdc (c=1, 2, 3) - SK _c Supply of capital by householdc - SD _c Supply of land by householdc - DL _j Demand for labor in the industryj - DK _j Demand for capital in the industryj - DD _j Demand for land in industryj - GDL Government demand for labor - GDD Government demand for land - TL _j Tax on labor in industryj - TK _j Tax on capital in industryj - TD _j Tax on land in industryj - GCE _i Consumer demand for consumer producti (i=1, 2, ..., 15) - Z _ji A 14×15 transformation matrix - RCS _ic RAS balanced matrix of each household's demand for each consumer good - TC _j Excise tax on consumer goodj - TRN _c Transfer payment to householdc - PIT _c Personal income tax payment for householdc - TAU _c Marginal income tax rate for householdc - SAV _c Savings in householdc - GC _c Gross consumption of householdc - ZTA Consumption plus leisure coefficient - TE Total government endowments - EM _j Demand elasticity of export demand - FE _j Endowment/demand sector of adjusted elasticity of export demand - GSK _j Government endowment of capital in industryj - GDK _j Government demand for capital in industryj - GTL Government wage taxes on its own employees - TXO _j Government output tax on industryj - TC _c Consumption taxes on householdc - CG _c Total government consumption by householdc - SAV _c Total savings by householdc - INV _j Total investment by industryj The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the policies of the organizations with which they are affiliated. They would like to thank Wildrido Cruz of the World Bank and Climenta Habido of the Philippine government for help in acquiring the requisite data to calibrate the model used in the analysis. They would also like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.     

Randomization, revelation, and redistribution in a Lerner world

Summary. If total social income is fixed and a social planner is uninformed of the utility representations of different individuals, then Lerner showed that the social optimum is to equally distribute income across individuals. We show that the planner by the use of randomization can in some circumstances induce individuals to reveal information about the curvature of their utility functions and then use the information to move away from equality on average. However, whether this is optimal depends in part on unobservable beliefs of the planner. These may be viewed as an aspect of the planner's ethical judgements or as something entirely arbitrary. Received: January 11, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001