Customer preferences for customized household furniture

In the context of market globalization, furniture manufacturers attempt to differentiate their products to attain competitive advantages. Mass customization is one strategy enabling such differentiation. This study measured, through a choice-based conjoint analysis, the value that US American consumers assign to the availability of customization when buying furniture. Roughly 50% of consumers’ product choice is driven by price, 20% by product customization, 20% by delivery time, and 10% by the time needed to customize the product. Thus, while there is a customer segment driven by price, there also is a segment, consisting mainly of females, that values product customization.     

Enhancing the Efficiency of Water Supply—Product Market Competition Versus Trade

In most developed countries, the provision of water is organized at a local level. The costs and tariffs vary significantly, even between adjacent water utilities. Such heterogeneity is an obvious indication of the sector??s overall inefficiency and stresses a need for institutional adjustments. We show that cooperation by water trade and the introduction of competition by common carriage between adjacent utilities are valuable alternatives to improve the industry??s efficiency, even when mergers are not feasible. Because both approaches require the physical connection of neighboring networks, they may have similar effects. This paper analyzes and compares the relevant welfare gains and shows that production efficiency and retail prices may differ depending on the initial cost differential, the application of regulations and the distribution of bargaining power. Using a theoretical model, we show that at higher initial production cost differentials, welfare is higher under competitive conditions, even in a lower-bound benchmark case without any regulation.     

Competitive Actions of Small Firms in a Declining Market

Small firms, through their flexibility advantages and closeness to customers, potentially can increase their sales volume in economic downturns. The decline in U.S. housing construction (beginning in 2006) provided an opportunity to develop and test four hypotheses predicting the attributes and marketing actions associated with successful companies supplying housing markets. Smaller firms and those producing made‐to‐order products were most likely to have realized increased sales volume. These successful firms were not engaged in several marketing actions hypothesized to increase sales volume in a declining market. Small firm competitiveness was based more on working closely with customers to produce fully customized products.     

Commitment to Innovation: The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics

Many organizational and environmental factors influence a firm's commitment to innovation. Among the organizational factors, the perceptual lens of the top management team and the team's dynamics are posited to have a significant direct impact on the firm's commitment to innovation. This study revisits the classic arguments of Hayes and Abernathy and empirically examines several of their propositions.
The results clearly indicate a positive relationship between the technical orientation of the TMT/CEO and above-average R&D intensity. This effect remains even after controlling for the impact of performance in prior periods and firm diversification. Overall, these results suggest that establishing a high level of commitment to innovation will be promoted or impeded in many organizations because of the predispositions of the CEO and top management team.     

The spatial structure of production with a leontief technology – II: Substitute techniques

The structure of the optimal spatial pattern of production is studied when there are dependencies among production units which can be described by a Leontief technology with substitute techniques, and when there is a single marketplace of final demand, the CBD. Transportation cost is proportional to distance. The various goods are produced in rings. There are a finite number of patterns in which these rings are arranged, and they can be obtained by a finite algorithm. The particular pattern depends on the final demand. Hence there is no ‘non- substitution’ theorem. ‘Reswitching’ of techniques can occur, that is, in an optimal pattern a technique may be operated at large and small distances from the CBD, but not at intermediate distances; this contradicts prevailing beliefs about optimal capital/land profiles.     

Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation

People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance, we disentangle reward motives in an experiment in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of the investor and delegate, we find that the trustee's rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who ultimately decides gets a higher reward. Unlike studies on the punishment of delegated unkind decisions, our results do not reveal a more sophisticated reward behavior that takes people's responsibility into account. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) is a software for developing and conducting economic experiments. The software is stable and allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time. In this article, I present the guiding principles behind the software design, its features, and its limitations. JEL Classification C92     

Financial Misrepresentation and Its Impact on Rivals

This paper examines how the announcement of an accusation of fraudulent financial misrepresentation affects industry rivals of the accused firm. Consistent with the importance of the industry competition effect, we find that rivals in less competitive industries benefit from the event. However, in competitive industries, the information spillover effect dominates the competition effect, resulting in negative returns to rival shareholders following the event. The spillover effect increases in importance with the severity of the accusation and is more important for opaque rivals and for rivals that had positive stock price reactions to past positive earnings surprises of the accused firm.     

WHY SOCIAL PREFERENCES MATTER – THE IMPACT OF NON-SELFISH MOTIVES ON COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND INCENTIVES

A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures.