Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs

This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream firms’ costs.      

How many educated workers for your economy? European targets,optimal public spending,and labor market impact

This paper studies optimal taxation schemes for education in a search-matching model where the labor market is divided between a high-skill and a low-skill sector. Two public policy targets - maximizing the total employment level and optimizing the social surplus - are studied according to three different public taxation strategies. We calibrate our model using evidence from thirteen European countries, and compare our results with the target from the Europe 2020 Agenda for achievement in higher education. We show that, with current labor market characteristics, the target set by governments seems compatible with the social surplus maximization objective for some countries, while being too high for other countries. For all countries, maximizing employment would imply higher educational spending than that required for the social surplus to reach its maximum.     

Beyond state-owned banks: Evidence from Shanghai bank customers

In light of a reformed and liberalized banking sector in China, this article sets out to examine the role of socio-demographic factors and customers’ banking experiences and priorities in customers’ selection of banks. As state-owned banks have long dominated the banking industry, the article also investigates the receptiveness of the Shanghai Chinese towards newer commercial banks, such as the joint-stock banks, and the penetration of foreign banks into China's banking industry. Comparing customers who use state-owned banks only and those who patronize joint-stock banks, it is found that education, income, age, occupation sector and location of hometown affects customers of state-owned banks only. Further, it is also found that state-owned banks remain dominant despite the opening up of the banking sector, and perception towards state-owned banks remains favourable.     

Network ties and entrepreneurial orientation: Innovative performance of SMEs in a developing country

This study investigates the role of intra-cluster ties, extra-cluster ties, and entrepreneurial orientation in shaping firms’ innovative performance. We conduct our analysis on a primary data set of 120 small and medium enterprises located in the Cibaduyut footwear-manufacturing cluster, Indonesia. We explore the effectiveness of knowledge acquisition through intra-cluster ties and extra-cluster ties on innovative performance. We find that extra-cluster ties mediate the relationship between proactiveness and innovative performance. Also, a combination of high extra-cluster ties and risk taking exert a positive impact on innovative performance. Surprisingly, we find that risk taking negatively moderates the influence of intra-cluster ties on innovative performance. Over-reliance on within-cluster knowledge sharing may result in the diffusion of redundant knowledge rather than making new knowledge available to the firm. Overall, our findings point to the synergistic effects of entrepreneurial orientation and extra-cluster ties on innovative performance.     

Climate Policy,Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries. We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation (that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends on the size of this nonparticipation cost.     

Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

Happiness,income and poverty

There is considerable evidence from a variety of sources to suggest that well-being is a function of relative income. These findings have been used to explain the Easterlin Paradox, whereby a rise in income for all does not lead to a rise in average happiness in a country (even though the cross section relationship between income and happiness is positive). This relativity of utility has led to calls for policy to focus away from GDP. I here first discuss some of the evidence that well-being is indeed relative in income, but then consider two relatively little-analysed issues to suggest that there may continue to be a role for GDP per capita in happiness-based policy: the inequality of subjective well-being, and the specific case of those in income poverty.     

The Real Equilibrium South African Rand/US Dollar Exchange Rate: A Comparison of Alternative Measures

This article indicates how different measures of the real exchange rate, i.e., the exchange rate adapted for cost inflation, price inflation and labour costs, influence the equilibrium view and misalignment of the South African rand/US dollar exchange rate. The approach followed is based on the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate approach by Clark and MacDonald (1998), where the exchange rate is influenced by a number of fundamental and transitory factors. The real equilibrium exchange is estimated by using a single equation regression and a number of key explanatory variables. To determine the long-run relationship a Vector Error Correction Mechanism is used.     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.