The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions

This paper uses the principles of constitutional economics to analyze the evolution of two international constitutions, the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. A graphical model is used to illustrate the formation and success of the international organizations created by these documents. This paper concludes that there were two factors that resulted in the failure of the League. They were the redistribution of power in favor of the smaller nations and the free-rider problem caused by the non-binding nature of the League's decisions. Amendments were proposed to the League's Covenant which may have fixed these problems, but they were never ratified. The reasons for the failure of the League had a strong influence on the wording of the U.N. Charter. The analysis in this paper is an extension of the tools provided by constitutional economics, which have mostly been applied to national constitutions. The author would like to thank Bruce L. Benson, Charles J. Barrilleaux, Stefan C. Norrbin, three anonymous referees of this journal, and especially Randall G. Holcombe for helpful comments and suggestions. Any shortcomings remain the responsibility of the author.     

Vibert's European union: A United Nations or a United States?

In his book, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, Frank Vibert explores every major issue that will arise in the design of a constitution for a European political union. Can the theoretical constructs of constitutional economics be used to aid in the practical design of a European constitution? This is what Vibert attempts to do in his book. This review contains a more detailed discussion and analysis of a few of Vibert's main theses. In particular, it focuses, on several key issues that will be the major determinants of whether the European Union will achieve lasting success.     

The projective independence axiom

Summary A new axiom for preference orderings over lotteries, called the projective independence axiom, is formulated. Given suitable continuity and monotonicity assumptions, the axiom implies that utility is either in the weighted utility class or is quadratic in probabilities. The betweenness axiom is used to distinguish between these two classes of functions.We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.     

Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings

This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the utility from outcomes of the individual and his opponents. The weight one player places on an opponent's utility from outcomes depends on the players’ joint behavior. In this way, the framework is rich enough to describe the behavior of individuals who repay kindness with kindness and meanness with meanness. The paper identifies restrictions that the theory places on rational behavior.     

Does cultural diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship?

In the economic development literature, cultural diversity (for example, ethnolinguistic fractionalization) has been shown to have a negative impact on economic outcomes in many underdeveloped countries. We hypothesize that the impact of diversity on economic performance depends on the quality of a country's institutions. Under bad institutions diversity leads to conflict and expropriation, while under good institutions diversity leads to economic progress. A culturally diverse society or interaction among different cultures encourages exchange of, and competition between ideas and different world views. Under good institutions, this amalgamation of ideas and views leads to greater entrepreneurial initiatives. We show that higher levels of cultural diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship in the presence of good institutions using evidence from the USA.     

Risk-Sensitive Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games

We present partial results showing that risk-sensitive oligopolists would spend less on advertising than would their risk-neutral counterparts. The model is an infinite-horizon stochastic game in which each firm's “goodwill” is a random function of both its own and its competitors' current and past advertising expenditures. Single-period firm profits have a market share attraction form. Each firm seeks to maximize its expected exponential utility of the sum of discounted profits. We analyze the impact that risk sensitivity and other parameters have on equilibrium advertising strategies by exploiting the special structure of the stochastic game model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C73.     

On the separability of the quasi concave closure of an additively separable function

This paper gives a characterization of the additively separable functions whose quasi concave closure also is additively separable.     

Share values, inflation, and escalating tax rates

The interaction of inflation with a progressive tax system has been known to cause tax rates, and thus tax liabilities, to escalate with nominal income. Often blamed for having undesirable effects on investment and wealth, this feature of modern tax systems has not received formal treatment in the literature. The present study examines the impact of this inflation-related phenomenon upon the value of corporate equity within the framework of partial equilibrium. It is shown that the combination of moderate inflation and a mildly progressive rate structure may have a substantial adverse effect on share values, an effect sharply increasing with the firm's real growth rate. These results provide a partial explanation for the apparent conflict between the Fisherian hypothesis and the commonly observed inverse relationship between the rate of inflation and the deflated value of stock price indices. To the extent that occasional adjustment of tax schedules does not prevent taxpayers from being pushed toward higher tax brackets, these results suggest a sizable potential benefit from full indexation of tax rates in an economy suffering from chronic inflation. They also confirm the belief that failure to do so is expecially harmful to economic growth.