Fair allocations of a renewable resource

In an economy with finitely many agents, one renewable resource, and an infinite horizon, it is shown that there is exactly one maximal allocation corresponding to given limiting shares of consumption and this allocation converges monotonically. Therefore, if there is no discounting, at most one fair maximal program exists—that which gives an equal amount to each individual in the limit. In this allocation, envy is always finite. However, only in special cases is it envyfree. This is in contrast to the case of finite economies where envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations may not exist or, if they exist, may not be unique.     

WHY IRA AND KEOGH PLANS SHOULD AVOID GROWTH STOCKS

This paper explores the effect of taxing personal income from common stocks on the return of equity portfolios held by mutual funds under IRA or Keogh plans. The expected rate of return earned by a tax-sheltered fund on any given stock is inversely related to the stock's per-share growth rate. The explanation for this effect does not rely on the standard assumption that growth decreases the effective rate of taxation. Rather, this effect holds despite heavier taxation of growth stocks because of the incomplete manner in which the return is sheltered. The implication of this finding for the optimal portfolio selection policy of tax-sheltered equity funds is inconsistent with evidence showing that such funds tend to concentrate in growth stocks. A second issue examined is the use of IRA and Keogh plans as a temporary tax shelter. Under the present 10-percent penalty on premature distribution, the critical investment period may be as short as two to three years. This finding indicates the usefulness of these plans as a general investment tool.     

Breeding and raiding: A theory of strategic production of skills

Some of the skills that firms require are obtained only through on-the-job-training. This paper concentrates on the strategic production of skills within the firm. Firms obtain high-quality workers either by training their own (breeding) or by using the open market to bid away workers trained by other firms (raiding). Even when all firms have access to the same technology of production, training, and breeding, it will typically be the case that both breeding and raiding will be pursued, with equal profitability, in equilibrium. Thus, we explain raiding behavior as part of an equilibrium theory. This paper also studies the effect of the decision to train workers on the optimal firm size and the distribution of income.     

First-order risk aversion and non-differentiability

Summary First-order risk aversion happens when the risk premium a decision maker is willing to pay to avoid the lottery , is proportional, for smallt, tot. Equivalently, 0$$ " align="middle" border="0"> . We show that first-order risk aversion is equivalent to a certain non-differentiability of some of the local utility functions (Machina [7]).We are grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support and to Kim Border, Larry Epstein, Mark Machina and Joe Ostroy for helpful discussions and suggestions.     

Generous actors,selfish actions: markets with other-regarding preferences

This paper points out that classical competitive outcomes arise in two different market environments even if agents have non-classical preferences. Consumers with separable, other-regarding preferences behave as if they have classical preferences in competitive equilibrium. These outcomes need not be efficient, but under plausible conditions will be efficient following a redistribution of income. In simple double-auction environments competitive outcomes arise under a wide range of assumptions on preferences even without assuming separability. I discuss the importance of the domain of definition of preferences and how the preferences present in the economy influence the performance of the trading institution.

The relative variability of state income and sales taxes over the revenue cycle

The cyclical variability of state income and sales taxes is examined for each state by estimating the degree to which each tax follows the state's overall revenue cycle. Income taxes are found to be consistently more cyclically variable, and less predictable, than sales taxes. Factors explaining differences in cyclical variability across states are then identified in a regression model. States without income taxes have less cyclically variable revenues than states with both income and sales taxes, suggesting that cyclical variability in states without income taxes could not be reduced by broadening the tax base to include an income tax.