A note on Bossert,Pattanaik and Xu's “Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterization of some decision rules”

Summary. Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules for individual decision making under complete uncertainty. This note shows that, in the case of two of these rules, they do not satisfy one of the axioms used for their characterization. A counterexample illustrating this fact is provided, as well as an alternative way to characterize the two rules under consideration, mantaining as far as possible the original axioms proposed by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu. Received: November 3, 2000; revised version: March 1, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am grateful for the encouragement and support of Professor Prasanta Pattanaik. I thank also the suggestions of two anonymous referees. This work was made during an academic visit to the Department of Economics of the University of California in Riverside (UCR). The visit was possible thanks to an invitation by the UCR and the financial support of the Public University of Navarra, the Government of Navarra, and the CICYT (SEC96-0858).     

Stickiness of Rental Rates and Developers’ Option Exercise Strategies

In this study we incorporate sticky rents into a real options model to rationalize the widely documented overbuilding puzzle in real estate markets. Given the assumption that developers’ objective function is to maximize total revenue by selecting an optimal occupancy level, our model provides a better explanation of the phenomena we observed in the real world than the traditional market-clearance based real options models. We also show that developers’ exercise strategies can be affected by the size and the type of property markets. In other words, developers’ exercise strategies could differ among markets and under different conditions. Submitted to Cambridge—Maastricht 2005 Symposium.     

Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.      

Optimal risk sharing with non-monotone monetary functionals

We consider the problem of sharing pooled risks among n economic agents endowed with non-necessarily monotone monetary functionals. In this framework, results of characterization and existence of optimal solutions are easily obtained as extensions from the convex risk measures setting. Moreover, the introduction of the best monotone approximation of non-monotone functionals allows us to compare the original problem with the one which involves only ad hoc monotone criteria. The explicit calculation of optimal risk sharing rules is provided for particular cases, when agents are endowed with well-known preference relations.      

Optimal dividend policy and growth option

We analyse the interaction between the dividend policy and the decision on investment in a growth opportunity of a liquidity constrained firm. This leads us to study a mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem for a diffusion that we solve quasi-explicitly by establishing a connection with an optimal stopping problem. We characterize situations where it is optimal to postpone the distribution of dividends in order to invest at a subsequent date in the growth opportunity. We show that uncertainty and liquidity shocks have an ambiguous effect on the investment decision.