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31.
J. Castellano-Paulis A. Hernández-Mendo Verónica Morales-Sánchez M. T. Anguera-Argilaga 《Quality and Quantity》2007,41(1):93-104
We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social,
16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate
and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations.
However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the
analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed.
This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential
analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained
a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed. 相似文献
32.
Rolando F. Peláez 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2005,29(1):127-137
This paper presents a logit model for dating business-cycle turning points. The regressors are monthly series from the Business
Cycle Indicators database of the Conference Board. Dividing the sample period into a subset for model initialization (1959∶9–1970∶12)
and a subset for testing (1971∶1–2003∶12) yields a chronology that is nearly identical to that established by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). However, the recognition lag is less than four months, in contrast to an average of more
than eleven months for the official chronology. (JEL E320)
The author is grateful for comments by an anonymous referee. 相似文献
33.
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal.
We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that
candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium
to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure
alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election.
In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative
will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible
in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington,
Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson,
Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial
support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at
Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality
is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
34.
Diánez-González Juan Pablo Camelo-Ordaz Carmen Fernández-Alles Mariluz 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2021,17(2):1007-1035
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper has been designed with a dual goal. On the one hand, the paper aims to examine the role of management teams, industry agents, and... 相似文献
35.
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm. 相似文献
36.
María Xosé Vázquez Rodríguez Carmelo J. León 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,28(2):233-249
Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population. 相似文献
37.
Conchita Garcés Ayerbe Carmen Galve Górriz 《International Advances in Economic Research》2003,9(2):123-132
This study presents theoretical arguments and evidence that attempt to show the contribution of economic mechanisms typical
of a business for resolving problems of environmental protection. Firstly, a brief synopsis is given of the classic solutions
that environmental economics proposes for correcting environmental externalities. Next, the benefit of expanding these two
mechanisms is discussed so that they include those intermediate mechanisms for which it is not possible to clearly establish
if they are developed within the domain of the market or the business. The study's focus resides in the fact that the explicit
expansion of the range of solutions proposed from a macroeconomic point of view establishes a connecting point between environmental
economics and business economics, an area in which academic attention to environmental matters has been significantly less.
The present work forms part of research project SEC2002-00835, financed by MCYT-FEDER. 相似文献
38.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
39.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
40.
Welfare reducing licensing 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous. 相似文献