SWITZERLAND: GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT, GROWTH OF CENTRALISATION

Switzerland has a tradition of decentralised government, decentralised tax setting and direct reference to the voters through referendums. Such mechanisms should give rise to lower taxes, better provision of public goods and higher economic growth. However, these mechanisms have not been effective in the last 30 years at preventing the growth in government spending and centralisation. This is partly because of the consensus in favour of centralisation that exists among institutionalised politicians. The performance of the Swiss economy since 1970 has consequently been dismal. Real per capita post-tax incomes have been stagnant. There is now an opportunity for the growth of centralisation to be reversed.     

Dominant institutional owners and firm value

This research analyzes the impact of control by dominant institutional owners (banking institutions and investment funds) on firm value. The analysis considers the level of voting rights in the hands of the dominant institutional owner and other large shareholders. The results reveal a different effect on value depending on whether the dominant institutional investor is a banking institution or an investment fund. Moreover, the results show that the presence of other large shareholders affects firm value when a dominant institutional owner controls the firm.     

The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms

This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era.     

Formalism, logic and reality: a Keynesian analysis

It is the purpose of this paper to elaborate on the argumentthat formalism is non-neutral; analyses which today would bedescribed as informal turn into something quite different whenformalised. The reasons for non-neutrality refer to the choiceof assumptions or axioms, the choice of method, the type oflogic employed and closure. Focusing on the last three of these,the paper addresses the question of how to move from resultsobtained with formal methods under conditions of closure tothe reality one is attempting to model. We explore the needfor provisional closure to analyse open systems and for a rangeof methods to complement formal modelling in the attempt tounderstand the complex reality of an economic system.     

The rebuilt marketing machine

Since its conception, the marketing mix has been the marketer's tool kit for success. A firm's marketing plan is basically comprised of the 4 Ps of the marketing mix tool kit, with practitioners and academicians segregating a marketer's tasks into product, place, price, and promotion. A decade of company-based research suggests, however, that it is time to rebuild the marketing machine by focusing upon the key strategic issues that companies, and marketers, face in today's rapidly evolving, digitized marketplace. If marketing is to become a way of doing business rather than merely one of several organizational functions, marketers must recognize that the marketing mix tool kit is truly an implement for success, just as an engine and wheels are necessary for successful navigation of an automobile. Only after we, as marketers, recognize and conceptualize marketing as a bigger machine than just the 4 Ps will we be able to bring a market orientation to the forefront of strategic thought.     

When financial markets work too well: A cautious case for a securities transactions tax

Unlike most major industrialized nations, the United States does not impose an excise tax on securities transactions. This article examines the desirability and feasibility of implementating a U.S. Securities Transfer Excise Tax (STET) directed at curbing excesses associated with short-term speculation and at raising revenue. We conclude that strong economic efficiency arguments can be made in support of a STET that throws sand into the gears, in James Tobin's (1982) phrase, of our excessively well-functioning financial markets. Such a tax would have the beneficial effects of curbing instability introduced by speculation, reducing the diversion of resources into the financial sector of the economy, and lengthening the horizons of corporate managers. The efficiency benefits derived from curbing speculation are likely to exceed any costs of reduced liquidity or increased costs of capital that come from taxing financial transactions more heavily. The examples of Japan and the United Kingdom suggest that a STET is administratively feasible and can be implemented without crippling the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets. A STET at a .5% rate could raise revenues of at least $10 billion annually.