Flood Risk Information,Actual Floods and Property Values: A Quasi‐Experimental Analysis

Hedonic property price analysis tells us that property prices can be affected by natural hazards such as floods. This paper examines the impact of flood‐related variables (among other factors) on property values, and examines the effect of the release of flood risk map information on property values by comparing the impact with the effect of an actual flood incidence. An examination of the temporal variation of flood impacts on property values is also made. The study is the first of its kind where the impact of the release of flood risk map information to the public is compared with an actual flood incident. In this study, we adopt a spatial quasi‐experimental analysis using the release of flood risk maps by Brisbane City Council in Queensland, Australia, in 2009 and the actual floods of 2011. The results suggest that property buyers are more responsive to the actual incidence of floods than to the disclosure of information to the public on the risk of floods.     

Networks of knowledge among unionized firms

Abstract.  We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.     

Spatial distribution of species populations,relative economic values,and the optimal size and number of reserves

We examine the tradeoff between the number and average size of nature reserves. When the costs of enforcing reserve boundaries are negligible, we find analytically that the relative price of biodiversity has a positive impact on the optimal total reserved area but an ambiguous impact on the optimal number of reserves. Simulation modeling of floral diversity in a tropical timber concession reveals that the resolution of this ambiguity depends on spatial distributions of the populations of tree species: whether or not they are spatially aggregated (clumped). The impact of biodiversity price on optimal reserve number remains analytically ambiguous when enforcement costs are not negligible. Multiple reserves being economically superior to a single reserve now requires, in addition to aggregation, a biodiversity price that is sufficiently high to offset the effects of enforcement costs. Most of our simulation scenarios generate threshold biodiversity prices that do not exceed a leading estimate of the marginal value of a higher plant species in the bioprospecting literature. Several smaller reserves evidently can be economically superior to a single larger one even in the presence of enforcement costs.      

The growth of point source plumes at Rayleigh numbers up to 108 and Prandtl numbers up to 1000

Two-dimensional numerical simulations were conducted of the growth of thermal plumes from a point heat source at Rayleigh numbers up to 108 and Prandtl numbers up to 1000. Scaling the convection equations by the free fall velocity rather than the thermal diffusivity, increased the Prandtl number range available to numerical simulation by one order of magnitude from Prandtl number 100 to 1000. We present animations showing how the plumes grow with time for different Prandtl numbers. Plumes with Prandtl numbers around 7 (water) were found to be unstable to sinuous instabilities; whereas those at Prandtl numbers of 1000 had straight stems and fewer sinuous instabilities. Wavelet analysis was used to analyze the scales at which plumes initiated, and the scales at which sinuous instabilities occurred. The scale of both the plume structures and instabilities was found to decrease with Prandtl number.     

Oral contraceptives and breast cancer: A consumer toxic tort

Recent epidemiological studies show a correlation between estrogen based oral contraceptives and breast cancer. In certain groups the studies indicate a two to four fold increase in breast cancer. The epidemiological data are bolstered by a well accepted connection between estrogens and breast cancer. The unique status of oral contraceptives and the special problem of breast cancer make this one of the first viable consumer toxic tort cases. Consumers in the United States who use oral contraceptives and develop breast cancer should be able to recover damages based on a theory of failure to warn.

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Orale Empfängsnisverhütungsmittel und Brustkrebs: ein Fall von Konsumentenvergiftung

Zusammenfassung Neuere epidemiologische Untersuchungen zeigen eine Korrelation zwischen oestrogenhaltigen oralen Empfängnisverhütungsmitteln und Brustkrebs. Für einige Gruppen deuten die Ergebnisse der Untersuchungen auf einen Anstieg von Brustkrebs auf das zwei- bis vierfache hin. Die epidemiologischen Daten werden durch eine auch sonst akzeptierte Beziehung zwischen Oestrogenen und Brustkrebs gestützt. Die einzigartige Stellung oraler Verhütungsmittel und das spezielle Problem des Brustkrebses machen daraus einen richtigen Fall von Konsumentenvergiftung. Konsumenten, die orale Verhütungsmittel benutzen und Brustkrebs bekommen, sollten auf der Grundlage der Theorie unterlassener Warnung Schadenersatz erhalten.

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Vincent Brannigan is Associate Professor of Consumer Law, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Christine Berg, Georgetown University, and Ruth Dayhoff, George Washington University, for their contributions to the medical analysis in this paper.     

European unification,single markets,and product safety: The American experience with federal/state regulation of housing safety

The integration of Europe into a single market is accompanied by debate over whether a unified market requires uniform product safety standards for consumer products. The experience in the United States is that a single unified market can be created despite a variety of state safety requirements for products. The market is single if all producers are able to satisfy the regulatory requirements, and no special restrictions protect in-state producers, even though all products cannot be sold in all places. However, such a market is not static but dynamic. Effective regulatory structures are required to keep various government levels from deliberately or inadvertently sabotaging the single market. The most common problem is the use of consumer protection or safety justifications for economic protectionism. The experience with kerosene heaters, aluminum wire, and factory built housing shows the complex system required to respond to all of the safety concerns related to consumer products. The European Community (EC) may need to develop such as system or run the risk of either limiting its economic development, or allowing the distribution of unsafe products.

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Europäische Einigung, Binnenmarkt und Produktsicherheit: Amerikanische Erfahrungen mit Bundes- und einzelstaatlicher Regulierung der Sicherheit von Haushaltsprodukten

Zusammenfassung Der europäische Einigungsprozeß wirft die Frage auf, inwieweit ein einheitlicher Binnenmarkt auch einheitliche Normen der Produktsicherheit verlangt. Die amerikanische Erfahrung zeigt, daß ein einheitlicher Binnenmarkt geschaffen werden kann, wenn alle Hersteller die geltenden regulatorischen Anforderungen erfüllen und keine speziellen Vorschriften einheimische Hersteller schützen, selbst wenn die Produkte nicht überall verkauft werden können. Ein solcher Markt ist jedoch dynamisch, nicht statisch zu verstehen. Effektive regulatorische Strukturen sind erforderlich, um die verschiedenen staatlichen Zuständigkeitsebenen daran zu hindern, bewußt oder unbewußt den Binnenmarkt zu torpedieren. Das drängendste Problem besteht darin zu verhindern, daß Verbraucherschutz oder Produktsicherheit als Mittel wirtschaftlicher Abschottung mißbraucht werden. Die amerikanischen Beispiele der Regelung von Kerosinöfen, elektrischen Leitungen aus Aluminium sowie fabrikmäßig hergestellten Wohnhäusern verweisen auf die Komplexität eines Regulierungssystems, das auf die verschiedenen Sicherheitsanforderungen bei Verbrauchsprodukten reagiert. Daraus folgt insbesondere:Das amerikanische Beispiel der Produktregelung basiert nicht auf einem theoretischen Regulierungsmodell. Es besteht keine Regel, daß ähnliche Produkte in gleicher Weise geregelt werden müßten. In den USA werden deshalb unterschiedliche einzelstaatliche Produktregulierungen wegen ihres Experimentalcharakters positiv bewertet. Es ist auch politisch konsentiert, daß die Einzelstaaten unterschiedliche Schutzniveaus von Produktsicherheit aufweisen. Es besteht ein dynamischer Spannungszustand zwischen Bundes- und einzelstaatlicher Regulierung, der dazu führt, die Klarheit, wenn auch nicht immer die Qualität der Regulierung zu verbessern. In gewisser Weise besteht ein Wettbewerb zwischen Bundestaat und Einzelstaaten über die Regelungsmöglichkeit. Das Regulierungssystem kann sich technologischem Wandel anpassen, wenn auch mit Verzögerungen. Bestimmte Besonderheiten sind nur historisch erklärbar.Zweifelsohne bestehen Ineffizienzien im amerikanischen System, vor allem dort, wo die Industrie in der Lage ist, die zentralen Elemente des Regulierungsprozesses zu kontrollieren. Der Begriff der am wenigsten den Handel beschränkenden Alternative erweist sich als entscheidend, um zu bestimmen, ob das einzelstaatliche Interesse an lokaler Kontrolle dem bundestaatlichen Interesse an Einheitlichkeit vorgeht. Die Offenheit des Systems, verbunden mit Verfahrensgarantien, kann dabei helfen, protektionistische Elemente im Regulierungssystem abzubauen.Die Autoren plädieren dafür, die Ergebnisse der amerikanischen Regulierungserfahrungen auf den verschiedenen Ebenen auch für die Herstellung eines europäischen Binnenmarktes unter Berücksichtigung eines hohen Schutzniveaus an Produktsicherheit nutzbar zu machen.

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Vincent M. Brannigan is Associate Professor of Consumer Law, Department of Textiles and Consumer Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA. Carol B. Meeks is Professor of Housing Economics, Department of Housing and Consumer Economics, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, USA.     

James M. Buchanan and the Political Economy of Desegregation

Were 1986 Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's formative contributions to political economy inspired in significant part by hostility to the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision? Nancy MacLean's 2017 Democracy in Chains argues that public choice economics emerged from an opportunistic alliance with Virginia's “Massive Resistance” to school integration and should thus be situated within the racially tinged tradition of southern conservatism. While Buchanan wrote very little on the economics of race, archival evidence and his published works do not support this thesis. Buchanan's work is better understood with reference to his Chicago school mentor Frank Knight and the Italian public finance tradition rather than southern conservatism. To the contrary, we suggest Buchanan believed the competitive processes generated by an educational voucher system would likely undermine rather than rescue the racially segregated status quo. Furthermore, Buchanan's associations and activities suggest that racial hierarchy was not part of his normative vision.     

Private Labels,National Brands and Food Prices

We study the relationships between national brand prices and the development of private labels, using home-scanned data from a consumer survey reporting purchases for 218 food products. When the impact of private label development is significant (116 cases out of 218), we observe a positive correlation (89%) between brand price and purchases of private labels. When controlling for changes in product quality, we still find a positive relation between private label development and national brand prices. Thus, the change in the national brand product characteristics only partly explains the increase in the national brand prices. Furthermore, the price reactions of national brands differ according to the type of private labels they face. Finally, we demonstrate that the development of private labels has less effect on the prices of second-tier brands than on the prices of the leading brand.