Individual Agents,Firms, and the Real Estate Brokerage Process

This study examines how individual agents affect house selling prices and time on the market while controlling for brokerage firm-specific effects as well as supply and demand conditions that vary by neighborhood. Firm size effects disappear once firm specialization and agent characteristics are taken into account but geographic concentration by firms leads to higher selling prices. For individual agents, neither sex nor selling own listings affects price or selling time, but there are gains from partnering transactions across firms. Agents who specialize in listing properties obtain higher prices for their sellers while those who specialize in selling obtain lower prices for their buyers. Houses nearer to other transactions of an agent sell for higher prices. Finally, greater scale of listing and selling activity by an agent tends to lower selling price or lengthen the time on the market.

The Economic Impact of SFAS NO. 157

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, “Fair Value Measurements,” (SFAS 157) defines fair value, establishes a three tiered framework for measuring fair value and expands the required disclosures about fair value measurements. The objective of this study is to examine and evaluate the benefits of the information disclosed by SFAS 157. The results of our study indicated that a large majority of the inputs are observable in that 93.5% of the sample financial assets and 93.1% of the sample financial liabilities were measured by level 1 or 2 criteria. However, we found a mismatch between assets and liabilities subject to the three tiers of fair value measurements. The companies in our sample disclosed $18.8 trillion in total assets, with 51%, or $18.8 trillion in total assets, with 51%, or 9.5 trillion reported at fair value. Whereas, sample company liabilities totaled 16.1 trillion with only16.1 trillion with only 3.7 trillion or 23% reported at fair value.     

Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.      

Minority banks and minority communities: Are minority banks good neighbors?

The lagging development of many minority communities has had an adverse effect on economic growth in the United States. One factor historically associated with creating or exacerbating this minority problem is the unwillingness of banks to service minority communities adequately. The federal government used two initiatives to address banks' reluctance to aid minorities: the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) that ended the practice of redlining and required all federally regulated banks to demonstrate that they served the convenience and credit needs of their local communities, particularly minorities, women, and other underserved groups, and the establishment and preservation of minority owned banks that were expected to be more sympathetic to the needs of their communities. This paper evaluates the extent to which minority banks have met the needs of minority communities. The assessment is conducted in the context of the ratings received by minority banks on their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) audits. Through the use of CRA audits, the performance of minority banks is also compared to the performance of the general banking community to determine the validity and success of the government's minority banking initiative. Analysis of CRA audit ratings also compares the performance of minority banks among different ethnicities.     

Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games

In this paper, we analyze a model where individuals from finite populations are repeatedly drawn to play a finite game and in every period choose a weakly better reply to a sample distribution from a finite history of past play. For all finite games and sufficiently incomplete information, we prove convergence to minimal sets closed under better replies. This result complements previous findings in a deterministic continuous-time framework and implies convergence to strict Nash equilibria in many well-known classes of games.     

Demand for redistribution,support for the welfare state,and party identification in Austria

This paper describes subjective wage inequality and the demand for redistribution in Austria using individuals’ estimates of occupational wages from the International Social Survey Program. Although these estimates differ widely across individuals, the data clearly show that most individuals would like to decrease wage inequality, relative to the level of inequality which they perceive to exist. The empirical analysis also shows that the demand for redistribution is strongly associated not only with variables describing self-interested motives for redistribution, but also with perceptions of and social norms with respect to inequality. Further, the demand for redistribution is a strong predictor for whether an individual is supportive of redistribution by the state. On the other hand, however, I find almost no evidence for an empirical association between the demand for redistribution and individuals’ party identification.     

Is There Any Change in the Public Service Values of Different Generations of Public Administrators? The Case of Turkish Governors and District Governors

In recent public administration literature, much attention is paid to changes in public service values, including ethical values, that guide public service. This paper reports on the results of an empirical survey conducted among a group of Turkish governors and district governors (including those in service and retired) who are from different generations. By focusing on the transformation of value preferences of Turkish governors and district governors, this study tries to identify variations in values, particularly about public service ethics, in accordance with the age and the length of tenure in public service. The findings of the research show a traditional and more or less consistent value pattern for Turkish governors and district governors. The most important public service values expressed by the respondents are consistent with often-mentioned crucial public service values in the literature. New or emerging values have not been present enough among the most important public service values. In brief, the results do not lend support to the often-assumed hypothesis that traditional public service values are devaluated or degraded by the emergence of businesslike values. In other words, new emerging values could not sneak into the public service culture in any convincing manner in spite of many years of NPM rhetoric and recipes.     

Bad Measures Don’t Make Good Medicine: The Ethical Implications of Unreliable and Invalid Physician Performance Measures

Drawing on the performance appraisal and medical literatures, we examine representative ethical issues involved in current appraisal practices of individual physicians: the use of invalid and unreliable measures; organizational goals conflicting with patient health goals; using individual measures for what are group performance results; making individual attributions for what are systemic causes (and results); and using clinical feedback for organizational purposes. Suggestions for developing more ethical performance appraisals include reflecting upon the multiple purposes and means of appraisals, and the limitations of current practices. Greater understanding of the effects of current appraisal practices on physicians can help minimize its potentially adverse consequences on the delivery of quality healthcare.     

What’s in a Credo? A Critique of the Academy of Management’s Code of Ethical Conduct and Code of Ethics

The Academy of Management formally adopted a Code of Ethical Conduct in 1990. During the subsequent 15 years, almost nothing had been published about it and its value as a formal document meant to guide professional practice. Rather surprisingly then, in December 2005 an entirely new Code of Ethics was introduced by the Academy’s Board, to take effect in February 2006. Why was a new code promulgated? More broadly, what do the contents of these codes, the processes of their promulgation, and their expressed purposes, suggest about the value of such codes for similarly situated professional associations, in general? This article seeks to identify key strengths and weaknesses of the original code, begin an assessment of the potential value of the new code, and so stimulate debate. Further, not only is this a call to the members of the Academy to engage in some thoughtful debate and possible amendment of its new code, but also a caution to all such associations to take seriously the hurdles that must be jumped before any code can be developed and promulgated to worthwhile effect.     

“I don’t Care that People don’t Like What I Do” – Business Codes Viewed as Invisible or Visible Restrictions

Research about codes of corporate ethics has hitherto taken a hypothetical, correct meaning of codes for granted. The article problematises the dichotomous categories intrinsic and subjective meanings of codes. I address the question if professionals in finance accept codes of business. The particular mentality of stockbrokers and traders constructs the way they judge restrictions such as company codes of ethics. While neglecting dimensions of ethics beyond known rules, brokers and traders distrust good ethics as a possible end in itself. Many professionals in the financial market perceive efforts to integrate ethical reasoning in work as only means for maximising business opportunities.