Reason as a Nexus of Natural Law and Rhetoric

Although the pages of Journal of Business Ethics have hosted an ongoing dialogue on the ethics of rhetoric and persuasion, the debates have been unable to account for the underlying morality of the human propensity to engage in rhetorical discourse as a part of living in society. In this paper, I offer natural-law ethical theory as a moral paradigm in which to examine rhetoric. In this context, I assert that rhetoric services reason, which in turn services our dispositions or inclinations that are one ideological foundation of natural-law theory. As rhetoric affects the apprehension of these dispositions it subsumes a related morality in which rhetorical endeavors can be seen as “natural”. So endowed, I believe that this conception of rhetoric offers a number of philosophical and practical implications, one of which is a new way to assess the morality of commercial manifestations of rhetoric such as spin and the use of puffery in advertising.     

Agency Theory,Reasoning and Culture at Enron: In Search of a Solution

Applying evidence from recently available public information on Enron, I defined Enron’s culture as one rooted in agency theory by asserting that Enron’s members were predominantly agency-reasoning individuals. I then identified conditions present at Enron’s collapse: a strong agency culture with collectively non-compliant norms, a munificent rare-failure environment, and new hires with little business ethics training. Turning to four possible antidotes (selection, objectivist integrity, integrity capacity, and stewardship reasoning) to an agency culture under these conditions, I argued that the currently available ethics literature would have made little difference toward averting Enron’s collapse if any of the recommendations from the relevant ethics literature had been implemented. I conclude by identifying new directions for business ethics literature in order to make it more implementable under the conditions identified at Enron. Essentially, we need a way to clearly determine (1) the difference between connivance and commitment, (2) what is meant by balance with regard to the multiple dimensions of ethics and legal theories, and (3) the proper balance between agency and stewardship reasoning. Brian E. Kulik is a Ph.D. candidate in Management at Washington State University’s School of Business. His work focuses on the prevention of corporate corruption, corporate governance and ethics, teamwork and diversity, and research methods. His research to date has appeared in the Western and National Academy of Management conference proceedings and the journal Organizational Analysis. He earned M.S. degrees from Washington State University and The University of Cincinnati, and M.B.A. from The University of Denver.     

On the microstructure of price determination and information aggregation with sequential and asymmetric information arrival in an experimental asset market

Summary. Experiments were conducted on an asset with the structure of an option. The information of any individual is limited, as if only the direction of movement of the option value known for a single period without information of the value from when movement was initiated. However, if all information of all insiders were pooled, the value of the option would be known with certainty. The results are the following: (1) Information becomes aggregated in the prices as if fully informative rational expectations operated; and (2) The mechanism through which information gets into the market is captured by a path dependent process that we term The Fundamental Coordination Principle of Information Transfer in Competitive Markets. The early contracts tend to be initiated by insiders who tender limit orders. The emergence of bubbles and mirages in the markets are coincident with failures and circumstances that prevent the operation of the Fundamental Principle.The financial support of the national science foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science are gratefully acknowledged. The authors have benefited from helpful comments of David Grether, Kerry Back, Ivana Komunjer and Pete Kyle.     

A risk assessment model for banks

Summary. This paper proposes a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction among banks, where the actual risk an individual bank bears also depends on its interaction with other banks and investors. We develop a two-period general equilibrium model with three active heterogeneous banks, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. The model is calibrated against UK banking data and therefore can be implemented as a risk assessment tool for regulators and central banks. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors.We are grateful to Lea Zicchino, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the Bank of England, and the third Conference in Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Syros, for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England.This revised version was published online in January 2005 with corrections to the Cover date.     

The bias in Black-Scholes/Black implied volatility: An analysis of equity and energy markets

In this paper we examine the extent of the bias between Black and Scholes (1973)/Black (1976) implied volatility and realized term volatility in the equity and energy markets. Explicitly modeling a market price of volatility risk, we extend previous work by demonstrating that Black-Scholes is an upward-biased predictor of future realized volatility in S&P 500/S&P 100 stock-market indices. Turning to the Black options-on-futures formula, we apply our methodology to options on energy contracts, a market in which crises are characterized by a positive correlation between price-returns and volatilities: After controlling for both term-structure and seasonality effects, our theoretical and empirical findings suggest a similar upward bias in the volatility implied in energy options contracts. We show the bias in both Black-Scholes/Black implied volatilities to be related to a negative market price of volatility risk. JEL Classification G12 · G13     

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms

Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments to executives on information that is not available to those outside the firm. This raises two issues. First, market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Second, because information that is non-public is, by extension, non-verifiable, the firm cannot write explicit contracts based on it. Combining the relational incentive contracts and financial signaling literatures, we examine equilibria of a signaling game in which bonus payments from a firm to a manager convey non-public information regarding the firm’s future cash flows. Our main result is that increases in corporate myopia can, under some conditions, lead to increased profits. This finding is contrary to that typically found in financial signaling models.     

Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy

Using a hazard model, we examine secular changes in the ability of financial statement data to predict bankruptcy from 1962 to 2002. We identify three trends in financial reporting that could influence predictive ability with respect to bankruptcy: FASB standards, the perceived increase in discretionary financial reporting behavior, and the increase in unrecognized assets and obligations. A parsimonious three-variable model provides significant explanatory power throughout the time period, with only a slight deterioration in predictive power from the first to the second time period. The striking feature of the results is the robustness of the predictive models over a forty-year period.JEL Classification: M41, G14, G33, C41     

Market Efficiency and Returns to Simple Technical Trading Rules: Further Evidence from U.S., U.K., Asian and Chinese Stock Markets

Tian, Wan and Guo (2002) explored the predictability and profitability of technical trading rules in markets with different efficiency levels; namely, the U.S. and China. In the case of the U.S. they found rules to have no predictability after 1975, whereas their results give support to technical trading rules having both predictability and profitability for the Chinese markets across the 1990's. The purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis of Tian et al. in two ways. First, to see if the conclusions extend to other markets – namely, the U.K., Hong Kong and Japan. Second, in the case of China, to examine whether the predictability and profitability of technical trading rules changed across the 1990's. On the basis of daily data Tian et al's results for the U.S. market are supported by the results for a number of the main developed markets where the technical trading rules had predictive ability during the 1970's that disappeared by the 1990's. Furthermore, the results suggest that while technical trading rules had short term predictive ability and profitability in the Chinese stock markets during the 1990's, this lessened as the decade progressed. JEL Classification: G14, G15     

Comparison of randomization techniques for low-discrepancy sequences in finance

This paper deals with comparisons of low-discrepancy sequences in terms of actual performance through numerical computation for option pricing. For that purpose, we construct a variety of randomized low-discrepancy sequences based on classical low-discrepancy sequences. A randomization structure by coordinate-wise and digit-wise permutations proves to give excellent results regardless of the classical low-discrepancy sequences. This paper represents only the author’s personal opinion, and has absolutely nothing to do with his affiliation.     

A Modified GARCH Model with Spells of Shocks

The GARCH model is modified to capture the effect on volatilities of the consecutive number of positive or negative shocks. The new model is tested against the Shanghai Shcomp and Nikkei225 indices and found particularly useful in analyzing the Shcomp index. Similarly, the EGARCH model is extended along the same line as the GARCH model and is applied to the same sets of data. Stationarity of the new GARCH (1, 1) model is proved, and also derived is the asymptotic distribution of the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator.