Predicting consumers’ cheating behavior. The role of mental representation of goods and psychological ownership

This study examines the likelihood of cheating when consumers are offered with the option of using postponed payment plans after purchasing hedonic goods. It addresses how the nature of the good combined with payment timing affects its perceived psychological ownership, which in turn influences consumers’ cheating behavior. Three experimental studies indicate that when consumers mentally represent a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) good, they are more likely to cheat. This effect is greater with a postponed payment than with an immediate one. Findings also show that perceived psychological ownership is lower for hedonic goods and this explains different levels of cheating behavior. The paper offers managerial guidance on how to increase perceived psychological ownership for hedonic goods, with the goal of reducing cheating behavior.     

A Multiagent Model for Coordinated Distribution Chain Planning

The aim of this article is to show the advantages that the use of a multiagent model can provide in implementing vertical and lateral coordination among the components of a noncentralized distribution chain. This model has been implemented in Java language in order to allow for the development of a Web-based decision support system that can perform the coordination strategies, simulated in this article in a real logistics chain.

This article, after introducing the main concepts related to the adoption of coordination mechanisms within a supply chain, the main issues of agent-oriented technology, and a brief review of the related literature, presents the structure of the proposed model and the static and dynamic behaviors of the decision-making agents. The design issues of specific coordination models, the negotiation mechanisms introduced, and their proper tuning are then discussed. The models have been applied to a real two-level distribution system of an electromechanical company, made up of a supplier and a geographically distributed network of retailers. Experimental results showed the benefits derived from the adoption of coordination-based models, above all in supply contexts, characterized by relevant information sharing among the main tiers of the chain.     

A model-based indicator of the fiscal stance

We argue that the conventional approach to assessing the fiscal stance based on econometric tests of the government present value budget constraint (PVBC) is of limited practical use. We propose an alternative measure that focuses on short-run fluctuations in the fiscal stance, namely, a model-based indicator that compares a target level of the debt-GDP ratio at a given point in the future with a forecast based on the government budget constraint (GBC) where the forecasts are obtained using a recursively estimated VAR. By log-linearising the GBC the index can be decomposed into the various different components of which it is comprised. Using data from 1970 to 2011 we conduct a detailed time-series study of the fiscal stances of four countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Greece and we calculate the index for 11 other EU countries. For most countries the index shows that their fiscal stances vary from being too loose to too tight. Almost without exception the index drops sharply from 2007 showing the harmful effect on their fiscal stances of the recent recession.     

Depths and spreads in futures markets: Relationship with order execution,submission, and cancellation

This paper examines the relationship between limit order submissions and liquidity. We find that there is a negative relationship between the limit order arrival rate and the depth at the best quotes (limit order queue length) and a positive relationship between submissions and bid–ask spreads. This is consistent with queuing theory, which predicts that an increase in the limit order arrival rate increases the queue length and the time to execution of a limit order. Consequently, limit order traders cover the increase in costs and risks associated with the increase in the time to execution of limit orders by increasing bid–ask spread.     

The impact of limit order anonymity on liquidity: Evidence from Paris, Tokyo and Korea

This paper examines the impact of broker anonymity on bid-ask spreads in order driven markets. Previous theoretical research predicts that limit order anonymity results in deeper and more liquid markets. This paper examines this proposition using three natural experiments provided by Euronext Paris, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Korea Stock Exchange. Euronext Paris and the Tokyo Stock Exchange removed broker identifiers from limit orders on April 23, 2001 and June 30, 2003, respectively. In contrast, the Korea Stock Exchange introduced broker identifiers for limit order books on October 25, 1999. The results provide evidence that altering limit order anonymity has an impact on liquidity. Consistent with expectations, liquidity is enhanced by increased anonymity and adversely affected by decreased anonymity.     

Fiscal disequilibrium in developing countries

Fiscal equilibrium necessitates that ‘permanent’ government expenditures be covered by ‘permanent’ government revenues. The concept of ‘permanent’ goverment expenditures and revenues takes into account future revenue from capital investments as well as temporary windfalls. Hence, equilibrium may exist despite temporary imbalance between revenue and expenditure. The causes of disequilibrium can be classified into five categories: export boom; price-inelastic tax system; public enterprise performance; increased expenditure produced by political exigencies or administrative weaknesses; and worsening terms of trade. In practice, unrealistic customs valuations, specific as opposed to ad valorem taxes and administrative difficulties have been the most common sources of declining government revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product. Increased subsidies both to consumer goods and to public enterprises as well as inadequate control mechanisms have been the most frequent causes of rising government expenditure.