Digital economy and regulatory issues. Introduction

This special issue contributes to the topical field of Internet economics. The articles focus on multi-platform competition, the changing role of telecommunications regulation, issues of net neutrality, and open source software and innovation.     

Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts,risk premia,and access options

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk...     

Dynamics of two-sided internet markets

This paper presents a dynamic view of a two-sided market combined with Dixit’s approach of entry deterrence used in industrial economics. Resolving backwards the development to reach the point of entry deterrence in time the model splits the business strategy of the first entrant in a social network market into three phases: Market Entry, Automatic Growth Path, Exploiting Monopolistic Rents. A result is that the company has to solve the trade-off between the height of registration fees and marketing efforts in time. The real world story, that registration fees are omitted by social network provider in the Internet and the companies nevertheless invest in marketing and technology, so that they have to take losses during the first years, can be explained. In contrast to standard assumptions about the strategy of Schumpeterian pioneers, in social networks the market leader does not exploit monopolistic profits at the beginning.     

Economic prospects of Pakistan and Bangla Desh

Pakistan was built upon a common religion as the ideological basis for forming a state, but the experiment foundered. The peoples of West and East Pakistan were too different for enabling this bracket to sustain natural divergencies over a geographical gap of nearly 1300 miles. The main cause for the split were the economic relations between the two parts of the state.     

Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies

This paper considers methods of price structure regulation of electricity transmission in the context of an independent transmission company (TRANSCO). The focus is on two-part tariffs where the variable part would reflect congestion charges (and ancillary services) while the fixed part would reflect capacity costs. The two-part tariffs form a price-cap index, and the firm could rebalance prices, as long as the index satisfies the price-cap constraint. The firm would then have incentives to trade off congestion against capacity expansion in such a way that it becomes profitable to expand, whenever the costs of congestion on average exceed the costs of expansion. However, with chained Laspeyres weights in the price-cap index expansion may be suboptimal. We therefore discuss ways to improve the expansion factor. Implementing the regulatory schemes considered suggests a hybrid approach combining a TRANSCO with an independent system operator (ISO).     

Toward improved and practical incentive regulation

The first half of this paper overviews traditional methods of ratemaking—embedded and marginal cost pricing—and four recent alternatives—automatic rate adjustments, profit-sharing, tariff menus, and the Vogelsang-Finsinger convergence mechanism—that have come to challenge them. We develop a list of nine desirable properties that are suitable to gauge any regulatory mechanism. In the second half of the paper, we explore in greater detail two recent incentive plans—the FCC's price caps approach and a mechanism that the three authors proposed in a FERC document. Based on the nine properties, these two mechanisms are compared.     

Are U.S. regions converging? Using new econometric methods to examine old issues

Are different regions of the United States experiencing convergence in levels of GDP? Carlino and Mills (1993) examined this question through time-series techniques, and found some evidence in favor of regional convergence. This paper checks the robustness of their results by using new econometric methods proposed by Vogelsang (1998). Our results, together with results from Loewy and Papell (1996), suggest there is stronger evidence in favor of convergence than previously thought based on the results of Carlino and Mills (1993). First version received: September 2000/Final version received: December 2000     

Has Europe missed the endgame of telecommunications policy?

The European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) is a major milestone in the EU's telecommunications policy. But is it such a step forward and are the technical and market developments such that the EECC is the endgame? An endgame would mean that sustainable competition is reached in all telecommunications markets. The current paper argues that the EECC's new policy goal of investment in very high capacity connectivity could actually lead to policies that end in sustainable infrastructure competition. The EECC's policies, however, are not courageous enough to reach this goal. This lack of courage also characterizes the EU's gatekeeper policies on call terminations and net neutrality. In both these areas an endgame with sustainable competition is possible.     

Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion

Electricity transmission pricing and transmission grid expansion have received increasing attention in recent years. There are two disparate approaches to transmission investment: one employs the theory based on long-run financial rights (LTFTR) to transmission (merchant approach), while the other is based on the incentive-regulation hypothesis (regulatory approach). In this paper we consider the elements that could combine the merchant and regulatory approaches in a setting with price-taking electricity generators and loads. The monopoly transmission firm (Transco) is regulated through benchmark or price regulation to provide long-term investment incentives. The two-part tariff approach used can be analyzed analytically only for well-behaved cost and demand functions. We explore a series of simplified transmission grids to argue that in a variety of circumstances those functions could have reasonable economic properties. The results suggest directions for further research to explore the properties of the cost functions and implications for design of practical incentive mechanisms and the integration with merchant investment in organized markets with LTFTRs.