Bid‐ask spreads,volatility, quote revisions,and trades of thinly traded futures contracts

We investigate intraday bid‐ask spreads (BAS), volatility, and trading activity of thinly traded equity index futures contracts on the Singapore Exchange. Contrary to previous findings, we find a rather flat BAS pattern during the trading day. However, consistent with past findings, an increase in risk widens the spread and a higher trading activity reduces it. When trading occurs in a day, spreads are reduced. No significant difference in volatility between days with and without trades was detected. When trades occur, quote revisions increase, and it is positively related to the number of trades. An increase in the number of quote revisions increases the likelihood of a transaction, and when quotes are current, revisions that are accompanied by trades carry new information. We provide evidence that contracts that are thinly traded may possess liquidity attributes as long as their price quotes remain current. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:455–486, 2003     

Local economic strategies and area based initiatives — another view of improvement areas

In this continuing discussion on the role of industrial improvement areas the author extends the arguments to suggest how IIAs could be a progressive planning tool linking economic, property and land-use strategies.     

The Impact of Option Introduction on Stock Return Variances: The Role of Bid-Ask Spreads, Return Autocorrelations, and Intrinsic Variances

The purpose of this paper is to examine changes in stock return variances following option introduction. The sample consists of National Market System stocks and employs both transaction returns and returns based on bid and ask quotes. Variances are decomposed into portions attributable to bid-ask spreads, return autocorrelations, and intrinsic variances. Spreads play a negligible role in explaining variance changes. A generally positive component to short-term autocorrelations falls following option introduction, increasing variances over short holding periods. Intrinsic variances fall prior to the October 1987 crash, but do not change after the crash with option introduction.     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF 12B–1 PLANS ON MUTUAL FUND EXPENSE RATIOS

In this paper we re-examine the effect of 12b–1 payments on mutual fund expense ratios by analyzing data from 1988 through 1991. The findings are consistent with previous studies that find charges are a dead-weight cost borne by shareholders. However, we show that this cost increases over time.     

Globalization frustrated: The case of white goods

This paper challenges the common view that mature industries are always ripe for global strategies. Based on data from the European Domestic Appliance industry, this paper shows how changing economic conditions can diminish the value of global strategies. Critical in these shifts were simultaneous rises in demand for variety (that eroded the benefits of scale and continental market share) and decreases in manufacturing scale (that permitted new supply options), which reduced the extent of the strategic market to national dimensions. They added complexity that decreased the profitability of the global players and increased that of national strategies. The fluctuating fortunes of leading firms are shown to have been caused primarily by choices of strategy, not by national factor costs.     

Focusing the fuzzy front–end in new product development

Effectively managing the 'upfront or fuzzy front–end' (FFE) of the product development process is one of the most important, difficult challenges facing innovation managers. In this paper, we define the FFE as the period between when an opportunity is first considered and when an idea is judged ready for development. We classify the outcomes of the FFE into product definition, time, and people dimensions. We suggest several strategies to manage the FFE by assigning a FFE manager or team; by providing organizational support for FFE activities; by understanding the sources of FFE ambiguity; by building an information system; and by developing relationships with supporters, partners, and alliances.     

Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.