Noisy chaotic dynamics in commodity markets

The nonlinear testing and modeling of economic and financial time series has increased substantially in recent years, enabling us to better understand market and price behavior, risk and the formation of expectations. Such tests have also been applied to commodity market behavior, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity, chaos, long memory, cyclicity, etc. The present evaluation of futures price behavior confirms that the resulting price movements can be random, suggesting noisy chaotic behavior. Prices could thus follow a mean process that is dynamic chaotic, coupled with a variance that follows a GARCH process. Our conclusion is that models of this type could be constructed to assist in forecasting prices in the short run but not over long run time periods.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: March 2003     

A Permanent Income Model of Public Consumption

This paper tests the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) for public consumption. Unlike private agents, a government is a representative national, infinitely-lived agent that usually faces no liquidity constraints. Thus, the expectation is that the PIH restrictions should not be rejected for public consumption. However, using U.S. data, the paper is unable to find evidence supporting the permanent income model of public consumption. Public consumption is found to be sensitive to lagged public income and too smooth relative to permanent public income. The results therefore cast doubt on the characterization of the public sector as a social welfare optimizing agent.     

Botswana's Macroeconomic Management of Its Mineral-Based Growth: It Used Mining Revenues for Development and Services but Must Now Broaden the Beneficiaries

Abstract . The economic performance and the political history of Botswana during 1974-84 contrasted significantly with the experience of virtually every other African country. The South African republic, immediately north of the Republic of South Africa, achieved steady real economic growth with improved social services and provision for its people's basic needs. This was achieved in spite of world recession and drought because its mineral wealth Was reserved for the people and mining companies had to pay for the privilege of extracting that wealth through a tax program limited to appropriating its surplus, while assuring the investors and entrepreneurs an adequate long-term return on capital and enterprise. But sound macroeconomic policies failed to provide even reasonably equitable benefits for the majority of the people. Sound micropolicies are needed to widen access to employment and earned income and to asset accumulation.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Parallel Neutrality

This paper develops the notion of parallel-neutral technical change for inputs and outputs. It is shown that parallel-neutral technical change generalizes existing radial notions of neutral technical change. A taxonomy of the structural consequences of parallel-neutral technical change is developed.     

The First U.S. Food Stamp Program: An Example of Rent Seeking and Avoiding

Abstract . Rent seeking involves the wasteful expenses incurred to secure, acquire, or maintain a monopoly position. Rent avoiding involves the expenditures undertaken to avoid the imposition of rent-seeking costs. Each represents a social cost of Tullock rectangle loss in addition to the dead-weight or Harberger triangle loss that combined to form the Harberger-Tullock trapezoid social cost. The first Food Stamp Program in the United States came about through the rent-seeking and/or rent-avoiding efforts of farmers, grocers, bankers, and other economic agents and did not lead to the promotion of social welfare. The evidence of these self-interested efforts was gleaned from articles in the New York Times and government documents. The first Food Stamp Program also fits the economic theory of regulation developed by Stigler, Jordan, Peltzman and others, and it involved imposed costs on economic agents as the program evolved.     

Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core

Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable insider trading be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.I thank Dan Arce, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled. A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information, written in August of 1991.     

On the uniqueness of individual demand at almost every price system

A simple new proof, based on Fubini's theorem, is given for the uniqueness of individual demand at almost every price system, even if preferences are nonconvex.     

On the timeliness of tax reform

This paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance. Quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption, but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits. Tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors, and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others. Such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity, and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion, than would a less reactive government strategy. Efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings, with possible associated costs, or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation.