The Pollution Terms of Trade

This paper introduces the concept of a ‘pollution terms of trade’ index. It measures the environmental gains or losses that a country sustains from engaging in international trade. The index distinguishes between the trade composition effect and the environmental technology effect. Calculations of the trade composition effect reveal a gap between developed and developing nations.     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition

The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updating a common prior based on individual information. We dispose of the common prior assumption for a homogeneous oligopoly market with uncertain costs and firms entertaining arbitrary priors about other firms’ cost-type. We show that true prior beliefs can not be evolutionarily stable when truly expected profit measures (reproductive) success.     

‘Thinking Before Acting’ or ‘Acting Before Thinking’: Antecedents of Individual Action Propensity in Work Situations

We introduce the concept of ‘individual action propensity’ to examine the approach of individuals towards solving situations for which they lack knowledge and/or experience about what to do. We focus on a naturally contrasting pair of responses: ‘thinking before acting’ or ‘acting before thinking’, and associate low action propensity with thinking one's way into understanding how to act, and high action propensity with acting one's way into understanding such situations. We build on regulatory mode theory – with its dimensions of locomotion and assessment and the trade‐off between speed and accuracy – to examine individual characteristics as predictors of individual action propensity. We find that individual action propensity is associated with being a woman, having fewer years of formal education, not relying on help‐seeking behaviours, and having a positive attitude towards spontaneity. Our findings shed light on why individuals take action, or not, and provide implications for research on organizational action propensity.     

Asset price bubbles in Arrow-Debreu and sequential equilibrium

Summary. Price bubbles in an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in an infinite-time economy are a manifestation of lack of countable additivity of valuation of assets. In contrast, the known examples of price bubbles in a sequential equilibrium in infinite time cannot be attributed to the lack of countable additivity of valuation. In this paper we develop a theory of valuation of assets in sequential markets (with no uncertainty) and study the nature of price bubbles in light of this theory. We define a payoff pricing operator that maps a sequence of payoffs to the minimum cost of an asset holding strategy that generates it. We show that the payoff pricing functional is linear and countably additive on the set of positive payoffs if and only if there is no Ponzi scheme, provided that there is no restriction on long positions in the assets. In the known examples of equilibrium price bubbles in sequential markets valuation is linear and countably additive. The presence of a price bubble means that the dividends of an asset can be purchased in sequential markets at a cost lower than the asset's price. We present further examples of equilibrium price bubbles in which valuation is nonlinear, or linear but not countably additive.     

Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the `information technology' of individual decision-makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision-making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only circumventing the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.     

Beyond survival: the implementation of new forms of work organization in the UK and German steel industries

This paper outlines and analyses the major changes in work-force organization that have been introduced by British and German steel producers in the past decade, against a backcloth of retrenchment in the industry, new product development and technological change. Including multiskilling, a reduction in demarcation and team–working, these changes have had a major effect upon the composition of the work–force and the nature of work undertaken at the shopfloor level.

While these changes have had a common broad trajectory, they have been introduced at a different pace and in different forms. The contrasts are provided not only at the international level, but between plants in the same countries. The paper further outlines the response of trade unions to these changes and the implications for industrial relations at the shopfloor level.