New social relations of digital technology and the future of work: Beyond technological determinism

This introduction sets out the context for the Special Issue and offers an in-depth reflection on key themes addressed by our contributors. The Special Issue aims to place the social relations of production at the centre of debates about technology and the future of work, and create space for greater critical reflection on what it means to go ‘beyond technological determinism’. We identify ways in which aspects of technological determinism continue to influence debates on technology, the labour process and industrial relations, despite efforts to reject it. We argue that this influence is manifested in some persistent problems within the literature including overly rigid periodisations (such as ‘platform capitalism’), a narrow conceptual repertoire (which reifies notions like ‘algorithmic control’) and a constricted empirical focus. We elucidate the value of a social shaping of technology (SST) approach to overcome these challenges and provide a brief overview of the articles contained within the issue.     

Hotel operator motives in UK sale and leaseback/management-back transactions

Sale and leaseback has become a major financing method in the hotel industry in the UK over the last 10 years, followed more recently by sale and management-back. This article, using interviews with current practitioners, examines the motivations of owner/operators in adopting these methods, identifying differences from generic motives in previous literature relating to the subject. It finds that, because of the integral part that hotel properties play in the delivery of customer service there are differences of opinion on the benefits of such an approach and there is a need to adopt some different considerations in the decision to use this method of funding.     

Exploring the Valuation of Corporate Social Responsibility—A Comparison of Research Methods

This paper argues the case that tests of how investors value corporate social performance (CSP) based upon realised stock market returns are liable to be weak tests if markets are efficient and firms change CSP policies infrequently. We provide a theoretical explanation of why this will be the case using examples to illustrate. Subsequently, we set out an alternative theoretical framework for the purposes of investigating whether markets place a positive, or a negative, valuation on CSP, and show why this is superior to tests based upon Tobin’s Q. Using US KLD data, we demonstrate that, as theorised, markets place a positive value on CSP that is not detected by conventional returns-based tests. Our conclusion is that researchers who are interested in the question of whether engagement with a corporate social responsibility agenda is a value-enhancing activity for a company (as argued by some stakeholder theorists) or value destructive (as argued by Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, The New York Times Magazine, 1970), need to look beyond returns-based tests to answer the research question posed.     

Britain,EMU and the European economy

In January 1999, 11 member countries of the European Union ‘irrevocably’ locked the foreign exchange values of their currencies to the euro, and they committed themselves to abandon their currencies in favour of the euro in 2002. As a result, these countries ceased to operate independent monetary policies. Monetary policy for the whole euro‐zone became the responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB), whose primary objective is to maintain a low and stable rate of price inflation for the euro currency. The rules governing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were laid down in the treaty of Maastricht in 1992. As conditions for entry to EMU, the treaty specified ‘convergence criteria’ which consisted of upper limits for several macroeconomic aggregates including, notably, a 3 per cent maximum for the ratio of the public sector deficit to GDP and 60 per cent for the ratio of public debt to GDP.1 In February 1998 the 11 applicant countries submitted statistical analyses relating to their satisfaction of these conditions. Despite doubts as to whether some of them had strictly met the conditions, the European Commission deemed them all eligible, and the euro was launched.2 The British government, though more clearly eligible than most other EU countries on the basis of the convergence criteria, decided to defer its decision on entry. In this paper we consider the arguments for and against Economic and Monetary Union, and in particular whether it would be in Britain’s interest to join. We begin with a brief review of the state of the European economy and an analysis of the first year performance of the new Euro currency. 1 Upper limits were also set on the rate of inflation, at 1.5 percentage points above the average inflation rate of the three countries whose inflation was the lowest, and on long term interest rates, at 2 percentage points above the average of the rates prevailing in the three low inflation countries. An additional condition applied to exchange rate stability relative to the EU average for the two years prior to entry.
1 Notable cases were Belgium and Italy with debt to GDP ratios of 122.2 per cent and 121.6 per cent, respectively. Presumably, these countries were allowed membership under Article 104c(2) of the treaty which allows the debt to GDP ratio to be exceeded if ‘. . . the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 60 per cent at a satisfactory pace’. The reader is left to judge whether Belgium and Italy fell within the ‘spirit’ of this article.