Jensen's alpha and the market‐timing puzzle

Theory predicts that market‐timing activities bias Jensen's alpha (JA). However, empirical studies have failed to find consistent evidence of this bias. We tackle this puzzle in a nested model analysis and show that the bias contains an exogenous market component that is unrelated to market‐timing skill. In a comprehensive empirical analysis of US mutual funds, we find that the timing‐induced bias in JA is mainly driven by this market component, which is uncorrelated with measured timing activities. Measures of total performance that allow for timing activities are virtually identical to JA, even if timing activities are present in the evaluated fund. Hence, we conclude that JA is a sufficient measure of total performance.     

Alpha forecasting in factor investing: discriminating between the informational content of firm characteristics

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - This paper applies a linear alpha forecasting framework to enhance commonly used factor investing strategies by taking into account the informational...     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

Estimation of zero-intelligence models by L1 data

A unit volume zero-intelligence (ZI) model is defined and the distribution of its L1 process is recursively described. Further, a generalized ZI model allowing non-unit market orders, shifts of quotes and general in-spread events is proposed and a formula for the conditional distribution of its quotes is given, together with a formula for price impact. For both the models, MLE estimators are formulated and shown to be consistent and asymptotically normal. Consequently, the estimators are applied to data of six US stocks from nine electronic markets. It is found that more complex variants of the models, despite being significant, do not give considerably better predictions than their simple versions with constant intensities.     

Monitoring or payroll maximization? What happens when workers enter the boardroom?

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine whether worker representation on corporate boards results in improved monitoring or payroll maximization. Several economic theories predict that worker...     

Geometric Asian option pricing in general affine stochastic volatility models with jumps

In this paper, we present some results on Geometric Asian option valuation for affine stochastic volatility models with jumps. We shall provide a general framework into which several different valuation problems based on some average process can be cast, and we shall obtain closed form solutions for some relevant affine model classes.     

Global private information in international equity markets

This paper studies international equity markets when some investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many countries simultaneously. We use a dynamic model of equity trading to show that global private information helps explain US investors’ trading behavior and performance. In particular, the model predicts global return chasing (positive co-movement of US investors’ net purchases with returns in many countries) which we show to be present in the data. Return chasing in our model can be due to superior performance of US investors, not inferior knowledge or naive trend-following. We also show that trades due to private information are strongly correlated across countries. A common (global) factor accounts for about half their variation.     

Together we invest? Individual and institutional investors' trading behaviour in Poland

This paper contributes to the debate about individual and institutional investors' trading behaviour with new evidence from the Polish stock market. While most existing studies focus on institutional investors' trading in developed markets, we test for the presence of herding during market up- and downswings on an emerging market. Our unique approach is to combine an established method relying on daily prices with institutional features of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. It enables us to separate individuals from institutions by examining two trading mechanisms with different investor structures. The empirical results suggest that individuals engage in herding during market downswings, while there is less evidence of imitating trading behaviour in bullish markets. Regardless of the state of the market, institutions' trading behaviour does not appear to exhibit herd behaviour. Further evidence suggests that herding by individuals becomes less pronounced over time.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.