Economists' Opinions of Economists' Work

A bstract .   Economists' credibility has been waning in recent years. Critics usually cite the profession's preoccupation with abstract reasoning and its focus on seemingly irrelevant topics that hold little interest for individuals outside the discipline. While economic science has enormous potential for improving living standards, the profession's adverse reputation is indicative of a discipline seemingly void of any social contribution. This article presents the results of a recently conducted survey of professional economists. The survey was undertaken to ascertain economists' opinions of their own professional work, including the progress of economic research, its usefulness for society, and factors that determine the publication of that research.     

Perceived conduct and professional ethics among marketing faculty

This paper describes the results of a mail survey to the educator membership of the American Marketing Association. Data were collected regarding beliefs about both the frequency of occurrence and severity of 59 ethical issues facing marketing faculty. The research questions examined include: What unethical practices are believed to most commonly occur? What practices are most severe? How do these beliefs vary by faculty rank and size and type of school? Implications for both the improvement of marketing education and for future research are provided.     

Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Deregulation,news releases,and price discovery

We hypothesize that the firm’s regulatory environment influences the sensitivity of its equity value to information. Using intraday stock price data of utilities operating in differing regulatory environments we test for systematic differences between the responsiveness of stock prices of utility firms operating in deregulated and regulated environments to a common information set. Our findings reveal sharp differences in responses, with those of utilities operating in deregulated environments the strongest, and the responses of utilities in highly regulated environments the weakest. While the evidence supports our hypothesis, in a broader sense, the evidence suggests that deregulation aids in the process of price discovery. We also find evidence that suggests that deregulation, per se, does not lead to higher stock price volatility.      

The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development

A middle class consensus is defined as a high share of income for the middle class and a low degree of ethnic divisons. The paper links a middle class consensus to resource endowments, along the lines of the provocative thesis of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997 and 2000). This paper exploits this association using tropical resource endowments as instruments for inequality. A higher share of income for the middle class and lower ethnic divisions are associated with higher income and higher growth, as well as with more education, better health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less political instability, less civil war and ethnic minorities at risk, more social modernization and more democracy.     

Convenient estimators for the panel probit model: Further results

Bertschek and Lechner (1998) propose several variants of a GMM estimator based on the period specific regression functions for the panel probit model. The analysis is motivated by the complexity of maximum likelihood estimation and the possibly excessive amount of time involved in maximum simulated likelihood estimation. But, for applications of the size considered in their study, full likelihood estimation is actually straightforward, and resort to GMM estimation for convenience is unnecessary. In this note, we reconsider maximum likelihood based estimation of their panel probit model then examine some extensions which can exploit the heterogeneity contained in their panel data set. Empirical results are obtained using the data set employed in the earlier study. Helpful comments and suggestions by Irene Bertschek and Michael Lechner are gratefully acknowledged. This paper has also benefited from comments by two anonymous referees and from seminar participants at the Center for Health Economics at the University of York. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

Price-Cap Regulation and Inefficiency in Relative Pricing

The allocative efficiency properties of three price-cap schemes are compared. The scheme that uses lagged quantities in the price index and has a fixed cap works well when the firm is myopic but generates inefficient relative prices otherwise. With myopia prices are efficient and welfare is higher than with equal pricing, but the gain to the firm comes at the expense of lower consumer surplus. When the firm is not myopic pricing can be so inefficient that steady-state welfare is below the no-regulation level.