Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

Who Cites What?

The present paper analyses citations in the work of a large number of PhD students. We show that the pattern of citations of journal articles, books and other reference material differs substantially across areas within economics. An investigation of reciprocal citations reveals a surprisingly low degree of communication among the Group of Eight universities and a high propensity to cite authors from the same institution, especially supervisors. We also analyse the Australian share of cited works, and identify journals, articles and authors that PhD students value highly.     

When do auctions ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?

We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this “use value” and for its “foreclosure value,” because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare‐maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage. Bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare‐maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies.     

International currency speculation,market stability and efficiency in the 1920s: A time series approach

Vector autoregressive time-series modelling methodology is applied to the 1920s exchange-rate data for France, Germany, the U.S.A., Belgium, and Holland. A Wald test is found to conclusively reject the hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate for all five currencies. Details are given of various external shocks that may have influenced the exchange rates and these are dealt with by a set of dummy variables. The data series exhibit some rapid depreciations and nonstationarities of interest to econometricians and time series analysts.     

Evidence of Stock Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume: A Threshold Quantile Regression Approach

This paper presents a capital asset pricing model‐based threshold quantile regression model with a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic specification to examine relations between excess stock returns and “abnormal trading volume”. We employ an adaptive Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo method with asymmetric Laplace distribution to study six daily Dow Jones Industrial stocks. The proposed model captures asymmetric risk through market beta and volume coefficients, which change discretely between regimes. Moreover, they are driven by market information and various quantile levels. This study finds that abnormal volume has significantly negative effects on excess stock returns under low quantile levels; however, there are significantly positive effects under high quantile levels. The evidence indicates that each market beta varies with different quantile levels, capturing different states of market conditions.     

Agency Conflicts and Risk Management

This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts andrisk management. In contrast to previous contributions, ouranalysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflictsbut also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that thecosts of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essentialin determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firmsthat derive more of their value from assets in place (lowermarket-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment,generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, theymay be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestmentincentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firmswith fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartramet al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictionsrelating the benefits associated with risk management to variousdimensions of the firm's economic environment.     

Forward Discount Bias: Is it Near-Rationality in the Foreign Exchange Market?*

A risk-averse US investor adjusts the shares of a portfolio of short-term nominal domestic and foreign assets to maximize expected utility. The optimal strategy is to respond immediately to all new information which arrives weekly. We develop a model to estimate the cost of optimizing less frequently and find that it is generally very small. For example, if the investor adjusts portfolio shares every three months, an average expected utility loss of 0.16 per cent p.a. is incurred. Hence, slight opportunity costs of frequent optimization may outweigh the benefits. This result may help explain forward discount bias.     

Salesperson stereotypes,consumer emotions,and their impact on information processing

This study examines salesperson stereotypes and their effect on the selling environment. After reviewing relevant literature, the authors advance a hierarchical structure of salesperson stereotype categories. Experimental results suggest that stereotypes influence consumer emotions, and these emotions then mediate the relationship between stereotype activation and subsequent consumer cognitions. He received his Ph.D. from Louisiana State University in 1991. His expertise is in the area of consumer behavior and research methods. Current research topics center on consumption-related emotions, their measurement, and their impact on decision making. His research appears in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Consumer Affairs, Advances in Consumer Research, as well as in numerous other national and regional publications. He received his Ph.D. from Louisiana State University. His research centers on sales management and the conflicting roles of salespeople. His work appears in prestigious outlets such as theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, Journal of Marketing Education, as well as in various conference proceedings. He received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina. He was named Outstanding Marketing Educator by the Academy of Marketing Science in 1990. He has published more than 400 scholarly articles in prestigious outlets such as theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing Research, andJournal of Marketing.