The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and the Volatility of Exchange Rates after the Asian Crisis: A Counterfactual Analysis

The objective of this paper is to carry out a counterfactual analysis of the impact of alternative exchange rate regimes on the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the bilateral rate against the US dollar for nine East Asian countries after the Asian financial crisis. Our hypothetical regimes include a unilateral basket peg (UBP), a common basket peg (CBP) and a hard peg against the dollar. We find that a UBP would minimise effective exchange rate volatility for all countries and provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. Although the gains for a CBP are always less than those for a UBP, the absolute differences between the two regimes appear to be small. In terms of the bilateral relationship against the dollar, the gains from a UBP or CBP could be quite significant for the non‐dollar peggers since a fall in effective instability would be accompanied by a fall in bilateral instability.     

Cointegration, Efficiency and Forecasting in the Currency Market

Existing literature on using the cointegration approach to examine the efficiency of the foreign exchange market gives mixed results. Arguments typically focus on econometric testing techniques, with fractional cointegration being the most current one. This paper tries to look at the issue from an economic perspective. It shows that the cointegrating relationship, whether cointegrated or fractionally cointegrated, is found mainly among the currencies of the European Monetary System which are set to fluctuate within a given range. Hence, there is no inconsistency with the notion of market efficiency. Yet, exploiting such a cointegrating relationship is helpful in currency forecasting. There is some evidence that restricting the forecasting model to consist of only cointegrated currencies improves forecasting efficiency.     

Participation: 'bounded freedom' or hidden constraints on user involvement

User participation in information systems development is often surrounded by assumptions that the resultant system will be a success, will reflect user needs, and that the process results in an empowered workforce. This paper argues that underlying these foreground rational assumptions are instrumental, politically motivated justifications driving the need to involve users.