Social learning and costly information acquisition

Summary. Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable q\theta and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information acquisition prevents an unbounded accumulation of public information if (and only if) the marginal cost to acquire information is positive at zero (C￠(0) > 0)(C^\prime (0) > 0). When C￠(0) = 0C^\prime (0) = 0 public precision at period n, _boxclose_boxclose\tau_n, tends to infinity with n but the rate of convergence of public information to q\theta is slowed down with respect to the exogenous information case. At the market outcome agents acquire too little private information. This happens either with respect to a (decentralized) first best benchmark or, for n large, with respect to a (decentralized) second best benchmark. For high discount factors the limit point of market public precision always falls short of the welfare benchmarks whenever C￠(0) > 0C^\prime (0) > 0. In the extreme, as the discount factor tends to one public precision tends to infinity in the welfare-optimal programs while it remains bounded at the market solution. Otherwise, if C￠(0) = 0C^\prime (0) = 0 public precision accumulates in an unbounded way both at the first and second best solutions. More public information may hurt at either the market or second best solutions.     

Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

Optimal Quotas, Price Competition And Products'' Attributes

We characterize the Nash equilibrium in the Hotelling model in the presence of an import quota. The optimal quota is identified and shown to be invariant to the mode of competition. We also prove that in the presence of a quota maximal differentiation is not achieved at equilibrium.     

Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain,who might lose,and why?

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33     

理直才能气壮--论中国天然气发展的七大关系

增加天然气这一优质、高效、洁净能源在我国能源消费中的比例．是实现国家总体能源战略的重要举措要实现2010年天然气在中国一次能源供应中占8％的目标．必须“理直”天然气发展中的七大关系,所谓“理直”才能“气壮”。一是“理直”天然气与其他能源,特别是与煤炭之间的关系;二是“理直”天然气行业上中下游之间的发展关系;三是“理直”天然气发展与电力发展之间的关系：四是“理直”短期利益与长期发展,燃气行业与相关市政产业之间的关系;五是“理直”天然气成本、定价和税收之间的关系：六是“理直”竞争与保护,政府监管与企业作用之间的关系：七是“理直”天然气行业内与行业外之间的关系。只有在整体的能源政策下“理直”了这七大关东,天然气的终端用户市场才能得到快速发展,天然气供应各环节的商业可行性才能得到保障,国内外市场参与者的积极性才能得到发挥,中国的天然气行业才能茁壮成长。     

Putting one-to-one marketing to work: Personalization, customization, and choice

The tailoring of a firm’s marketing mix to the individual customer is the essence of one-to-one marketing. In this paper, we distinguish between two forms of one-to-one marketing: personalization and customization. Personalization occurs when the firm decides what marketing mix is suitable for the individual. It is usually based on previously collected customer data. Customization occurs when the customer proactively specifies one or more elements of his or her marketing mix. We summarize key challenges and knowledge gaps in understanding both firm and customer choices in one-to-one markets. We conclude with a summary of research opportunities.