Does character's gender matter in inspirational brand story? Exploring the moderating effect of gender role conformity

Inspirational brand story is a widely used marketing strategy in brand building. However, few empirical studies have investigated the underlying mechanism and boundary conditions of a successful brand story strategy. The current study examined the influence of lead character's gender in inspirational brand story on consumer–brand identification based on the social identity theory, benevolent sexism, and gender schema theory. Results from two experiments demonstrated that the gender of inspirational brand stories has an impact on consumer brand identity through the mediation effect of sympathy. Compared with a male character, a female character elicits viewers' sympathy, which results in high brand identification. Such a gender effect is stronger when there is a high level of perceived gender role conformity. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

无视科学底线的大胆创新-陈禹、谢康《知识经济的测度理论与方法》评述

中国人民大学出版社在1998年出版了一套《知识经济时代丛书》,作者多是信息科学、管理科学和经济科学方面的专家学者。其中中国人民大学信息学院院长、中国信息经济学会副理事长陈禹教授和中山大学谢康副教授(均为"作者简介"的职称和职务)合著的《知识经济的测度理论与方法》(以下简称《测度》)引人注目。因为"知识经济"的测度是一个困难的问题。     

A comparison of Ad valorem and per unit taxes in regulated monopolies

This paper compares the output and revenue effects in the rate-of-return regulated monopoly model. Both the ad valorem and the unit tax generally decrease the use of capital, and as such, reduce the output and raise the price. In addition, it is shown that Suits and Musgrave's conclusion of higher revenue of an ad valorem tax at a given output can apply to a regulated monopolist if the marginal product of labor under the ad valorem tax is greater than or equal to that under the unit tax. Similarly, their second conclusion, that for a given tax revenue an ad valorem tax has a larger output than a unit tax rate before the revenue-maximizing tax rate, can also apply to the regulated monopolist.     

Are all investment decisions to subscribe to new stocks mindless?Investor heterogeneity and behavior in the process of subscribing to new stocks

The IPO process is a way for companies to improve their corporate governance and for investors to assess company quality.This paper posits that investor choices...     

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.     

Does the transformation of accounting firms’ organizational form improve audit quality?Evidence from China

In this study,we examine the effects of the transformation of accounting firms’organizational form on audit quality.We find that the transformation from limited...     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.