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11.
Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts
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Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Australian economic papers》2015,54(2):121-134
We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner. 相似文献
12.
Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Bulletin of economic research》2013,65(Z1):s56-s84
This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function. 相似文献
13.
Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2012,33(4):249-272
The main purpose of this paper is to disclose the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the differentiated‐products model with two stages: (i) owner‐shareholders negotiate managerial compensation with their managers that comprises their profits and sales (sales delegation) and (ii) they engage in their market competition. The other purpose of this paper is to study the differentiated goods model in which an owner bargains the managerial compensation with her/his manager that comprises her/his profit and her/his rival's profit (relative performance delegation). We further investigate the situation wherein the firm with sales delegation and the firm with the relative performance delegation coexist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
14.
Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts
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Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2017,38(3):326-343
This paper studies the endogenous choices of strategic contracts in a duopoly with bargaining between the owner and manager of each firm over the content of the managerial delegation contract. We show that when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner within each firm is sufficiently high, quantity competition based on the quantity contracts chosen by the owners of both firms can be uniquely observed in the equilibrium, whereas quantity competition and price competition can be observed in the equilibrium when this relative bargaining power is sufficiently low. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
15.
Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade》2018,18(3):319-348
We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. the duopoly comprises a typical managerial firm with a sales delegation and a socially responsible firm (CSR firm) with a linear combination of social welfare and quantity as its managerial delegation contract. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium market structure changes from the case wthere both firms adopt sales delegation contracts to the case wthere one of the firms becomes a CSR firm, after the owners of the firms select their strategic contracts. We show that two market structures that are asymmetric with respect to their strategic contracts can become equilibrium market structures under the pure strategic contract class. Furthermore, we consider a unique mixed strategy equilibrium to examine how the risk domination between the two asymmetric equilibrium market structures affects equilibrium selection. there, we find that the competition wthere the firm with the sales delegation and the CSR firm have a price contract and a quantity contract, respectively, risk-dominates the competition wthere the firms have a quantity contract and a price contract, respectively. Finally, by deriving the order of social welfare among the four subgames, we show that the social incentive does not coincide with the private incentive in the robust equilibrium with respect to risk domination in the endogenous selection game of the strategic contracts of the asymmetric duopoly with the firm with a sales delegation and the CSR firm. 相似文献
16.
17.
Yasuhiko Nakamura 《Journal of Economics》2011,104(1):49-89
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the market structure in equilibrium and the most preferred
structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, when all existing firms can freely merge
with each other in an international oligopoly under the segmented market assumption in three cases: the case wherein all the
firms are entrepreneurial and the cases wherein they use two different types of managerial delegation contracts. We focus
our attention on the coincidence/non-coincidence between the equilibrium market structure (EMS) and the most socially preferred
structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, as each firm’s production efficiency
varies. When each firm’s production efficiency is relatively low, in all the three cases, the EMS coincides with the most
socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare in a large area of the
physical trade cost. On the other hand, when each firm’s production efficiency is relatively high, in the cases wherein they
use the two different types of managerial delegation contracts, there exists an area of each firm’s production efficiency
such that the EMS does not coincide with the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare
and total social welfare. Therefore, as each firm’s organizational structure proceeds from entrepreneurial to managerial delegation,
a more active merger policy is needed with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare. 相似文献
18.
We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous‐timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
19.
Yasuhiko Yuize 《Food Policy》1979,4(3):219-221
Let me choose a meal that would have been the least expensive for a Japanese consumer in 1955, 1960 and 1965. The meal would consist of a combination of wheat, minor grains, soybeans and green vegetables. The total price would be less than half of the actual average amount spent on food and drink during those years. Since the end of the second world war, Japan 's rice prices have been kept systematically high; rice would therefore not be included in the lowcost meal. If rice did replace the wheat and minor grains, the resulting combination of rice, soybeans and green vegetables would provide the raw materials for the typical traditional Japanese simple diet: a bowl of soup, a plate of vegetables, and a bowl of rice. 相似文献