Market Entry,Capacity Choice,and Product Differentiation in Duopolistic Competition under Uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of pre‐emptive competition for a leader's position on the investment strategies for market entry, production capacities, and product differentiation. In the absence of pre‐emptive competition, the leader's production capacity exceeds the follower's, and the leader earns excess returns. In contrast, in its presence, the leader's production capacity decreases below the follower's, and the follower's investment value exceeds the leader's when the follower enters the market. These results suggest the new insight that pre‐emptive competition provides the opportunity for the follower to expedite investing and to enhance investment value by capitalizing on the leader's insufficient capacity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effect of R&D tax credits for SMEs in Japan: a microeconometric analysis focused on liquidity constraints

This article estimates the effect of research and development (R&D) tax credits for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by utilizing the propensity score matching method to correct any possible selection bias. This study also examines whether the impact of tax credits differs with firms’ characteristics such as their industry, size, and liquidity constraints. Empirical results show that R&D tax credits induce an increase in SMEs’ R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effect of R&D tax credits on liquidity-constrained firms is much greater than on unconstrained firms.     

Technical Improvements and Welfare under International Duopoly

It is now common wisdom that a free-trading country with perfectly competitive markets might be hurt by its own technical improvement of that country's export industry, and that an improvement in the import-competing industry never impoverishes the country if no commodity is inferior for that country. This paper examines the welfare effects of technical progress in a perfectly competitive industry and in an internationally duopolistic market in a two-country, two-good, one-factor trading model. It will be shown that the above propositions are severely qualified in our setting with duopolistic industry.     

Forest owners’ willingness to accept compensation for voluntary conservation: A contingent valuation approach

To avoid conflicts often associated with mandatory regulations, it is crucial to motivate and incentivize forest owners to participate in voluntary conservation programs. To investigate forest owner preferences and willingness to accept compensation (WTA) to participate, we conduct a contingent valuation survey of non-industrial private forest owners in Norway. We find that WTA is negatively related to the size of the forest holding and absentee ownership, and positively related to the share of the forest classified as productive. The overall mean WTA per year per hectare is estimated at NOK 1800. Costs of reaching conservation goals can be saved by targeting small and relatively less productive forests and absentee owners first, before considering increasingly expensive forest areas. However, this recommendation only holds if desirable biological characteristics are not substantially less likely to be found in such areas. Results are potentially important both for our understanding of forest owner preferences and the costs of voluntary forest conservation schemes currently in use in many countries.     

Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis

We derive some sufficient conditions for the Suzumura-Ishikawa proposition on voluntary export restraints to hold when their model is extended to a general equilibrium framework. The sufficient conditions are concerned with the magnitude of income effects which play no role in the partial-equilibrium analysis of Suzumura and Ishikawa.     

Market Structure and Factor Price Equalization

There is a widespread belief that factor price equalization is "less likely" if some industries are imperfectly competitive and, in particular, that this is so if some industries are under the control of strategy-playing oligopolists. However, it is shown that, if each category of oligopolists is recognized as a primary factor of production, then the dimensionality of the set of endowments compatible with factor price equalization is independent of market structure.
JEL Classification Numbers: D33, D43, F12, L13.     

Bootstrap inference for impulse response functions in factor‐augmented vector autoregressions

In this study, we consider residual‐based bootstrap methods to construct the confidence interval for structural impulse response functions in factor‐augmented vector autoregressions. In particular, we compare the bootstrap with factor estimation (Procedure A) with the bootstrap without factor estimation (Procedure B). Both procedures are asymptotically valid under the condition , where N and T are the cross‐sectional dimension and the time dimension, respectively. However, Procedure A is also valid even when with 0 ≤ c < ∞ because it accounts for the effect of the factor estimation errors on the impulse response function estimator. Our simulation results suggest that Procedure A achieves more accurate coverage rates than those of Procedure B, especially when N is much smaller than T. In the monetary policy analysis of Bernanke et al. (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, 120(1), 387–422), the proposed methods can produce statistically different results.     

The role of the private sector under insecure property rights

It is well known that the so-called voracity effect can be observed in an economy with a weak property rights system. Voracious behavior is regarded as one of the excess uses of the common assets. In this paper, we seek to examine voracious behavior from a different perspective by introducing a new direction of capital flow: from the private sector to the common sector. A government mandates that all competing interest groups invest their private capital in the common sector to mitigate the effects of excess use of the commons. In this situation, we study how this capital flow affects the voracious behavior of the groups and the growth rate of the economy. The main findings are that, while there is no standard voracity effect, an increase in the contribution of the private sector into the common sector causes more voracious behavior and thus reduces economic growth. This suggests that policies designed to preserve the commons can lead to a harmful effect on the economy.     

对我国新的土地分类体系问题的探讨

在分析研究新的土地分类体系的基础上，阐明了新的土地分类方案的优缺点，提出了土地分类体系需要解决的几个关键问题及其改进建议。     

The Torrens–Ricardo Principle of Comparative Advantage: an Extension*

The Torrens–Ricardo Principle of Comparative Advantage rests on the special assumptions that, both in autarky and under free trade, all countries can produce all commodities and that, in autarkic equilibrium, each country consumes all producible commodities, at least incipiently. We reformulate the Principle to accommodate alternative assumptions. In our reformulation the emphasis is on marginal rates of substitution, not on the traditional marginal rates of transformation in production. It is shown in effect that, in existing formulations, the supply side is assigned a role that it can rarely sustain.