Emerging models of organizational buying processes

The purpose of this article is to assess past and current trends in the literature on buying decisions by organizations and to look constructively toward future problems and developments. Until recently, organizational buying behavior has been largely ignored. There are, however, a number of promising developments, and we might be at the threshold of moving from alchemy to the beginning stages of scientific understanding.The article starts with a brief discussion of the “methodological” and “substantive” choices that can be made in studying organizational processes that underlie buying behavior. An appreciation of these choices is necessary for the examination of the past and current literature. The major trends in the study of organizational buying behavior are then identified and evaluated. Building upon these trends, we sketch the basic dimensions of the organizational buying processes and highlight some of the major problem areas to be faced in future research and model development. Throughout the article we assume some familiarity with the professional and academic literature in industrial buying.     

A comparative analysis of performance assessment: international joint venture managers versus regional headquarters managers

This paper examines a relatively unexplored dimension within the IHRM literature: whether JV CEOs and representatives of their foreign parents' regional headquarters differ in their evaluations of JV effectiveness. This study is based upon a sample of 153 JVs located in China. Existing theories suggest an alternate rationale detailing why the evaluations of JV managers and their foreign parent companies should differ and why they should be similar. Our investigation generally finds that evaluations are similar, with some differentiation occurring when our sample is divided by JV age and by JV industry. Overall, the results suggest that isomorphic forces may exist between managers of JVs and managers of their foreign parents in the JV system.     

Venture capital: Structure and incentives

Venture capital is a major source of financing for firms in their early stages of development. Such businesses, especially in the high technology industries, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and asymmetry of information. In this paper we analyze the relationship between a venture capital organization (“capitalist”) and the initial owner of an entrepreneurial entity in which it invests (“entrepreneur”). We focus on the agency problems and derive a compensation system. In our model the capitalist provides a combination of equity and debt financing while the owner provides equity financing which serves as a signal affecting the beliefs (“optimism”) of the capitalist. The interesting result is that since the capitalist is assumed to be more risk averse than the entrepreneur, he is made to be more optimistic than the entrepreneur at the optimum.     

Incorporating affirmative action into the welfare state

In this paper, we discuss a novel aspect of affirmative action policy. We examine its redistributive role, asking whether in an egalitarian society, supplementing the tax-transfer system with an affirmative action policy would enhance social welfare. We demonstrate that affirmative action could be a desirable policy tool even if racial discrimination does not exist in the labor market.