Lotteries vs. All‐Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests

The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This article establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock‐type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all‐pay‐auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the designer's payoff under the optimal lottery is equal to his expected payoff under the optimal all‐pay auction.     

Trademark infringement and optimal monitoring policy

The paper addresses a trademark infringer who seeks to capitalize on the reputation of a trademark owner, sells an identical product under a trademark which is confusingly similar to that of the owner, charges the same price and competes with him in the same market. We show that the welfare-maximizing monitoring intensity is zero, hence the government is not likely to engage in monitoring infringement. Recognizing this, the trademark owner may consider monitoring the market himself, discovering, however, that this is worth his while only if the penalty for infringement, which he fully collects, is sufficiently high. Given the entry condition, an increase in the penalty may either raise or lower the optimal monitoring intensity. In the former case it will counter-intuitively increase the infringer's expected profit, apparently because a higher penalty will also lead to a raise in price. While monitoring enables the trademark owner to maintain a positive profit level, it reduces social welfare. The government may intervene to eliminate the private incentive for monitoring through taxing the collected penalty.     

Is food consumption a good proxy for nondurable consumption?

This paper examines whether there is a discrepancy in estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution using food consumption instead of nondurable consumption data. We show that a discrepancy exists and that the discrepancy increases as nondurable consumption increases.     

A flexible approach to estimate the equity premium

In this article, we estimate the risk aversion for households accounting for their lifetime consumption risk. Households take into account the overall lifetime uninsured consumption risk when optimizing their resources, which based on micro data varies across households. Thus, representing households’ consumption by merging cross-sectional micro data into the single Euler equation (the common approach for estimating risk aversion based on consumption-based asset pricing theory) may be too rough an approximation, leading to biased results with respect to risk aversion. Our results suggest that consumption-based asset pricing models that were rejected in several studies do in fact fit the data when we account for households’ lifetime consumption risk. This finding also has implications for long-run aggregate consumption-based asset pricing models.     

Multinational Corporations and Culture in Liberia

The proportion of multinational corporations (MCs) in a developing country (DC) has little to do with the degree of corruption of local culture that takes place. Rather, policy decisions taken by governments of DCs determine whether or not multinationals have a positive or negative impact, according to the author's research in Liberia among foreign managers, African supervisors, and Liberian workers. Even though Liberia has an “open door” policy toward MCs, very little violence has been done to Liberian culture. The reason is two-fold: 1) multinationals have maintained tight enclaves and have generally refused to integrate their values, managerial and otherwise, with those of the Liberian society; and 2) Liberian government officials have done little to generate Liberian interest in the business field or to force multinationals to play a more participative role in the society. The result has been “growth without development,” in the sense that the country's growth rate has increased over the years, but the Liberian people remain very much underdeveloped. A change of policy could bring about continued growth with development and without cultural disintegration.     

Overeating in all-you-can-eat buffet: paying before versus paying after

A widespread meal-serving system commonly blamed for contributing to the obesity epidemic is the all-you-can-eat buffet, where customers can help themselves to as much food as they wish to eat in a single meal for a fixed entry price. We set forth the hypothesis that buffet restaurants’ practice of collecting the price in advance, rather than at the end of the meal, encourages overeating. Viewing advance payment as a token of disrespectful treatment, we first establish this result theoretically by extending two recent and competing models on buffet behaviour to take account of the customer’s treatment experience. We then report the results of two experiments conducted in a sushi restaurant which support our hypothesis. The experiments reveal, ceteris paribus, that paying for the buffet meal after eating reduces sushi consumption by about 4.5 units, as compared to paying before eating. The result bears a straightforward and simple policy implication: To help reduce obesity, buffet restaurants should be banned from collecting the price in advance.     

“Timing Is Everything” and Marital Bliss

We first show that in a marriage market, when the stability of a matching is disturbed when a new agent joins the game, natural greedy behavior defines an equilibration procedure that converges to a stable matching for the extended problem. We then consider the iterative procedure under which agents join the game sequentially, and the natural greedy procedure is applied after the entrance of each agent. It is shown that this procedure converges to a stable matching for the original (global) problem and that for each agent, if the order of all other agents is given, he/she weakly improves his/her final outcome by deferring his/her arrival time. The agent that arrives last gets his/her optimal outcome under stable matchings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C62.     

Political activism,information costs,and stock market participation

This paper examines whether political activism increases people's propensity to participate in the stock market. Our key conjecture is that politically active people follow political news more actively, which increases their chance of being exposed to financial news. Consequently, their information gathering costs are likely to be lower and the propensity to participate in the market would be higher. We find support for this hypothesis using multiple micro-level data sets, state-level data from the US, and cross-country data from Europe. Irrespective of their political affiliation, politically active individuals are 9–25% more likely to participate in the stock market. Using residence in “battleground” states and several other geographic instruments, we demonstrate that greater political activism reduces information gathering costs and causes higher market participation rates. Further, consistent with our conjecture, we find that politically active individuals spend about 30 minutes more on news daily and appear more knowledgeable about the economy and the markets.     

Options as a Marketing Tool: Pricing a Promotional Scheme for a Product with a Secondary Market

Adding options to durable products allows new opportunities for manufacturers and retailers in markets with a secondary market to create better segmentation schemes, provide creative means to differentiate their products and services, and increase the value they offer consumers. This raises the need for sellers to properly price such options. This work presents a few examples of incentive programs for the car industry, develops models and calculates their cost to the seller, demonstrating the applicability of the proposed methodology. Our numerical results indicate that such options are surprisingly inexpensive for car manufacturers and dealers. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.