The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed. Earlier drafts of this paper were circulated under the title: “The Evolution of Perception Biases” and some of these results appeared in the earlier working paper Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2003). We thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Shannon thanks the NSF for research support under grant SES-0351346.     

Quantitative easing and Japanese bank equity values

One of the primary motivations offered by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) for its quantitative easing program—whereby it maintained a current account balance target in excess of required reserves, effectively pegging short-term interest rates at zero—was to maintain credit extension by the troubled Japanese financial sector. We conduct an event study concerning the anticipated impact of quantitative easing on the Japanese banking sector by examining the impact of the introduction and expansion of the policy on Japanese bank equity values. We find that excess returns of Japanese banks were greater when increases in the BOJ current account balance target were accompanied by “non-standard” expansionary policies, such as raising the ceiling on BOJ purchases of long-term Japanese government bonds. We also provide cross-sectional evidence that suggests that the market perceived that the quantitative easing program would disproportionately benefit financially weaker Japanese banks. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (4) (2006) 699–721.     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.     

Stock price volatility in a multiple security overlapping generations model

A number of empirical studies have reached the conclusion thatstock price volatility cannot be fully explained within thestandard dividend discount model. This article proposes a resolutionbased upon a model that contains both a random supply of riskyassets and finitely lived agents who trade in a multiple securityenvironment. As the analysis shows there exist 2^K equilibriawhen K securities trade. The low volatility equilibria haveproperties analogous to those found in the infinitely livedagent models of Campbell and Kyle (1991) and Wang (1993, 1994).In contrast, the high-volatility equilibria have very differentcharacteristics. Within the high-volatility equilibria verylarge price variances can be generated with very small supplyshocks. Adding securities to the economy further reduces therequired supply shocks. Using previously established empiricalresults the model can reconcile the data with supply shocksthat are less than 10% as large as observed return shocks. Theseresults are shown to hold even when the dividend process ismean reverting.     

Crime and income inequality: An economic approach

Conclusion When a given pie is redivided in a less equalitarian manner, it is uncertain whether those already undertaking illegal activity will increase or decrease their activities, since the return to illegal activities is countered by the loss due to punishment (which is more painful to a criminal who failed) on one hand, and from the cost of the sacrifice of utility from legitimate activities on the other hand.If the absolute level of wealth remains constant but relative position declines, an incentive is generated to re-establish a person's standing by joining the crime industry. This is certainly the case at the margin for those close to the boundary of joining, i.e., those who are almost indifferent between joining or remaining within the legal framework.Assuming an individual is already participating in illegal activities, the effect of either an absolute or relative change in his level of wealth on his level of illegal activities is indeterminate. This applies both to the case where the total wealth of the society is fixed and the share of the pie going to the rich rises and the case where the total pie rose but the entire gain went only to the rich.In summary, it has been shown that an increase in wealth inequality has an indeterminate outcome both with respect to the decision of the poor on whether or not to enter the crime industry and with respect to the decision of those already participating in illegal pursuits to increase or decrease their level of activity. This conclusion is somewhat contrary to the general consensus of the literature, which appears to hold that increases in wealth inequality will tend to increase both the level of participation in the crime industry and the level of output within the industry.     

Commercial software,adware, and consumer privacy

I study the choice between selling new software commercially and bundling it with ads and distributing it for free as adware. Adware allows advertisers to send targeted information to consumers which improves their purchasing decisions, but also entails a loss of privacy. I show that adware is more profitable when the perceived quality of the software is relatively low, when tracking technology improves, when consumers benefit more from information on consumer products and are less likely to receive it from external sources. I also show that improvements in the technology of display ads will lead to less violation of privacy and will benefit consumers, that depending on the software's quality, there are either too many or too few display ads in equilibrium, and that from a social perspective, adware dominates commercial software.     

Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

Monetary and Financial Integration in the EMU: Push or Pull?

This paper examines the channels through which monetary union increased financial integration, using panel data on bilateral international commercial bank claims from 1998–2006. I decompose the increase in claims into three channels: a "borrower effect," as a country's EMU membership may leave its borrowers more creditworthy in the eyes of foreign lenders; a "creditor effect," as membership in a monetary union may increase the attractiveness of a nation's commercial banks as intermediaries, perhaps through increased scale economies or through an improved regulatory environment after the advent of monetary union; and a "pairwise effect," as joint membership in a monetary union increases the quality of intermediation between borrowers and creditors when both are in the union. Isolating these three channels through a series of difference-in-differences specifications, I find that the pairwise effect is the primary source of increased financial integration. This result is robust to a number of sensitivity exercises.