How Do Risk Attitudes Differ within the Group of Entrepreneurs? The Role of Motivation and Procedural Utility

Starting a business involves risk and, thus, requires a risk‐taking attitude. The concept of risk and entrepreneurship has been widely discussed in the entrepreneurship literature; most studies compare entrepreneurs with nonentrepreneurs such as managers or bankers. So far, little research exists on the risk attitudes of the different types of entrepreneurs—those who pursue a new business because of opportunity and those who do so through necessity. This study aims to fill this gap. Our particular focus is on individuals' motivations to start their businesses and the nonmonetary returns from entrepreneurship. The results show that opportunity entrepreneurs are more willing to take risks than necessity entrepreneurs. In addition, those who are motivated by creativity are more risk tolerant than other entrepreneurs. The study contributes to the literature about both risk attitudes of entrepreneurs and necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship.     

The Welfare of Nations in a Globalized Economy

Is free trade always good for advanced industrialized countries? Are fears of globalization and outsourcing imaginary, totally unfounded, and misguided? Is the West always going to benefit from technological improvements in the East? This article constructs a few thought experiments to analyze such issues. The article provides some rational insight into the puzzle of why global trade is so controversial. The effects of technological improvements in the East on the welfare of both the East and the West are analyzed. The conclusion highlights some of the less desirable effects of outsourcing in a more globalized world.     

Management contribution and the allocation of time in a labor-managed firm

The problem of time allocation in a labor-managed firm is considered under a technology specification in which the role of management in the production process is different from that of “ordinary” members. Two allocation schemes are discussed, the egalitarian and the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that in the model discussed the Nash solution brings about an output level that is lower than the Pareto-optimal output level. If the manager seeks employment opportunities outside the cooperative that reflect his success as manager, he increases his time input so that the output of the cooperative and the “ordinary” members' utility levels increase.     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.     

Commercial software,adware, and consumer privacy

I study the choice between selling new software commercially and bundling it with ads and distributing it for free as adware. Adware allows advertisers to send targeted information to consumers which improves their purchasing decisions, but also entails a loss of privacy. I show that adware is more profitable when the perceived quality of the software is relatively low, when tracking technology improves, when consumers benefit more from information on consumer products and are less likely to receive it from external sources. I also show that improvements in the technology of display ads will lead to less violation of privacy and will benefit consumers, that depending on the software's quality, there are either too many or too few display ads in equilibrium, and that from a social perspective, adware dominates commercial software.     

Monetary and Financial Integration in the EMU: Push or Pull?

This paper examines the channels through which monetary union increased financial integration, using panel data on bilateral international commercial bank claims from 1998–2006. I decompose the increase in claims into three channels: a "borrower effect," as a country's EMU membership may leave its borrowers more creditworthy in the eyes of foreign lenders; a "creditor effect," as membership in a monetary union may increase the attractiveness of a nation's commercial banks as intermediaries, perhaps through increased scale economies or through an improved regulatory environment after the advent of monetary union; and a "pairwise effect," as joint membership in a monetary union increases the quality of intermediation between borrowers and creditors when both are in the union. Isolating these three channels through a series of difference-in-differences specifications, I find that the pairwise effect is the primary source of increased financial integration. This result is robust to a number of sensitivity exercises.     

Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

The capital structure and investment of regulated firms under alternative regulatory regimes

This paper explains how regulated firms choose their capital structure and examines the effects of this choice on investment and on regulated prices. It is shown that in equilibrium, firms have an optimal debt level and that given this debt level, the regulated price is set high enough to ensure that firms never become financially distressed. The analysis of the equilibrium yields testable hypotheses concerning the effects of changes in cost parameters and in the regulatory climate on the equilibrium investment level, capital structure, and regulated price. The analysis also shows that a regulatory restriction on the ability of the firm to issue securities may have an adverse effect on investment and consequently may harm consumers.     

Stable Provision vs. Cournot–Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies

Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83 , pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles.