A Simple Theory of Trade,Finance and Firm Dynamics

A stylized monopolistic competition model of international trade is proposed where firms differ with respect to the expected economic lifetime of their innovations. Upon entry, they receive a commonly observed signal which is updated over time. Jointly with partial irreversibility of investment, this generates heterogeneity in effective discount rates and, thus, in the cost of finance. In line with evidence, the model predicts a negative correlation between firms' financing costs and their age. Over a firm's life cycle, per period net profits and the export participation probability grow. Exporters are less likely to exit than purely domestic firms. Belief updating entails excessive financing of incumbents relative to entrants and too much exporting. Asymptotically, trade liberalization reduces overall general equilibrium exit rates, but it does not necessarily increase welfare. With multiple asymmetric export markets, firms gradually expand their market coverage and total sales. A confidence crisis modeled by belief reversion causes an over‐proportional decrease in exports, thereby offering a novel interpretation of the trade slump in 2008/09.     

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Investment in a New Technology as a Signal of Firm Value Under Regulatory Opportunism

We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the magnitude of investment signals high future demand may include a low degree of managerial myopia, large variability of future demand, a lenient regulatory climate, and low sunk cost. Our model suggests that in estimating valuation models of regulated firms it is important to separate firms into two groups: firms for which a separating equilibrium is likely to obtain and firms for which the equilibrium is likely to be pooling. The market value of a firm in the first group is positively correlated with its level of investment, but uncorrelated with the level of actual demand, whereas for the second group the opposite holds.     

Housing Return and Construction Cycles

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of the residential housing market. Within the model housing returns, housing construction, mortgage loan terms, and household maintenance behavior are all endogenous. These interacting elements tie expected housing returns to expected changes in family wealth. As a result: (1) families are credit constrained; (2) mortgage loan-to-value ratios can be used to forecast future housing returns; (3) developers acquire land when expected housing returns lie above the rate of interest and then develop when housing returns lie below. Thus, their holdings and construction decisions also forecast housing returns.     

Asset Price Persistence and Real Estate Market Illiquidity: Evidence from Japanese Land Values

We develop an overlapping generations model of the real estate market in which search frictions and a debt overhang combine to generate price persistence and illiquidity. Illiquidity stems from heterogeneity in agent real estate valuations. The variance of agent valuations determines how quickly prices adjust following a shock to fundamentals. We examine the predictions of the model by studying price depreciation in Japanese land values subsequent to the 1990 stock market crash. Commercial land values fell much more quickly than residential land values. As we would posit that the variance of buyer valuations would be greater for residential real estate than for commercial real estate, this model matches the Japanese experience.     

CROSS‐COUNTRY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2008 CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES AND AMERICAN EXPOSURE

We model the causes of the 2008 financial crisis together with its manifestations, using a cross‐country multiple indicator multiple cause model. We consider both national and, critically, international linkages between countries and potential crisis ‘epicentres’, including the United States. A country holding an epicentre's securities is exposed through a financial channel, while a country that exports to that epicentre is exposed through a real channel. We are unable to find strong evidence that international linkages can be associated with crisis incidence. In particular, exposure to the United States in either form has little impact. If anything, it appears to help.     

Informed speculation and hedging in a noncompetitive securities market

We examine an adverse selection model of trading in which bothinformed and uninformed traders are rational, maximizing agents.Replacing the price inelastic 'noise' or 'liquidity' traderswith strategic, utility-maximizing hedgers permits an explicitanalysis of the uninformed traders' welfare, and demonstratesthat several comparative statics obtained from the standardparadigm of Kyle (1984, 1985) are altered significantly uponendogenizing the trading motives of these agents. In contrastto extant models, market liquidity and price efficiency areboth nonmonotonic in the number of uninformed hedgers in themarket. Also, the welfare of hedgers monotonically decreaseswith the number of informed traders, despite greater competitionbetween the informed.     

Regional Competition for Domestic and Foreign Investment: Evidence from State Development Expenditures

We develop a model in which state governments spend funds on attracting capital with the intent of maximising the local net wage. Our results suggest that states are likely to spend less on economic development as the state wage level increases, and to spend more on industrial development as the state wage level increases, and to spend more on industrial development as the share of manufacturing in the state labor force increases. Empirical tests using state expenditure data confirm the predictions of the model.