Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency

Durable-goods producers frequently choose to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own products. This paper shows that, similar to leasing, one reason a firm may employ this practice is that it reduces or even eliminates problems due to time inconsistency. We first demonstrate this result in a setting closely related to Bulow's (1982) classic analysis of durable-goods monopoly. We then show the result in a setting similar to those considered in Waldman (1996, 1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) , in which new and used units are imperfect substitutes. The paper also discusses alternative explanations for the phenomenon.     

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the state. We provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure.     

Strategic management cycle: The underlying process building aligned linkage among operations practices

This study explores the mechanism of building an effective linkage among manufacturing practices that is a basic attribute of high performance manufacturing. High performance manufacturing companies are those that sustain high levels of performance over time. We propose a strategic management cycle, which explains how a firm establishes and maintains sustainable performance. We hypothesize and demonstrate how the cycle creates an effective linkage that integrates strategic activities and operational practices, which in turn yields high performance. We also argue and show how the first stage of the cycle, visionary planning, supported by the cross-functional culture, is a key to the high performance manufacturing company.     

Partial Ownership Induces Customised Investments Under Repeated Interaction: An Explanation of Japanese Manufacturer‐Suppliers Relationships

A dominant manufacturing firm often holds partial shares of its suppliers, and the suppliers are willing to make investments customised to the manufacturer. Furthermore, this type of manufacturer‐suppliers relationship is often long‐term and stable. This paper provides an explanation for this phenomenon by modelling repeated interaction between a downstream manufacturer and upstream suppliers. In the model, the manufacturer could avoid, by partially owning a supplier, hold‐up problems which would arise from the supplier's customised investment. The model distinguishes between two sources of appropriable quasi‐rents, and yields new empirical predictions concerning the relationship between appropriable quasi‐rents and vertical integration.     

Knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership

An alliance often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership (PEO), where alliance partners can choose the level of PEO. PEO can increase the alliance partners' profitability by inducing knowledge transfer, but the PEO itself reduces their joint profit because it induces other firms to take more aggressive actions. This trade‐off endogenously determines the level of PEO, which can benefit consumers and/or improve welfare. Given the growing antitrust interest in PEO, we explore the antitrust implications of our analysis.     

Does aid affect inequality?

We show that there was a negative correlation between pro-poor aid and inequality in the period before the mid-2000s. This article provides an explanation for this observed relationship. Using panel data on 34 countries for the period 1996–2014, we test the hypothesis that pro-poor aid has an inequality-reducing effect. To demonstrate that the negative correlation is not spurious, we use dynamic panel techniques with alternative specifications. We show that the share of pro-poor aid has a negative effect on inequality. In addition, we show that the interaction term between the poverty rate and the change in pro-poor aid has a significant effect. These empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. The results imply that aid can reduce inequality by altering the allocation of aid, rather than by increasing the amount of aid.     

Dynamic analysis of outsourcing

This paper develops an R&D-based growth model and calibrates the model to aggregate data of the US economy to quantify a structural relationship between patent length, R&D and consumption. Under parameter values that match the empirical flow-profit depreciation rate of patents and other key features of the US economy, extending the patent length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase in R&D despite equilibrium R&D underinvestment. In contrast, shortening the patent length leads to a significant reduction in R&D and consumption. Finally, this paper also analytically derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent length on capital investment.     

Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring

We demonstrate that efficiency is achievable in a certain class of N player repeated games with private, almost perfect monitoring. Our equilibrium requires only one period memory and can be implemented by two state automata. Furthermore, we show that this efficiency result holds with any degree of accuracy of monitoring if private signals are hemiindependent. Whereas most existing research focuses on two player cases or only a special example of N player games, our results are applicable to a wide range of N player games of economic relevance, such as trading goods games and price-setting oligopolies.