耕地发展权制度构建研究

研究目的：探求与耕地非农化、非粮化用途管制相适应的耕地权利人市场化补偿机制，为耕地保护法建立公平、长效耕地补偿制度提供参考。研究方法：规范分析法、比较分析法。研究结果：我国不同地区经济发展程度与耕地保护责任承担出现了错位，并且随着耕地用途管制的进一步强化，耕地保护财政补偿明显不足。立法上应当建立以耕地发展权为基础的耕地保护补偿制度，耕地发展权是耕地非农建设和非粮种植的权利，属新型用益物权，由耕地所有权人和用益物权人享有。应建立耕地发展权银行，推动耕地发展权转移，发展权受让人不仅要支付新增指标（限额）交易的费用，还应支付以所在地区指标（限额）交易价格为标准的费用，用以补偿既有耕地权利人。研究结论：耕地的非农化、非粮化严格用途管制，是对耕地权利人耕地发展权的限制，应以耕地发展权转移建立与耕地用途严格管制相适应的耕地补偿制度，以保障地区公平发展，提高耕地保护积极性。     

Macroeconomic tail risk,currency crises and the inter-war gold standard

We introduce macroeconomic tail risk into the canonical global game model of currency crises. The exchange rate peg is attacked if fundamentals reach a critical threshold, or if there is a sufficiently large public shock. Large shocks generate doubt amongst investors about both the state of the world and about what others know, giving rise to multiple equilibria. We find a non-monotonic relationship between tail risk and the probability of (a fundamentals-based) crisis and show how this effect depends on the magnitude and direction of public shocks. We consider the implications of policy intervention and identify conditions under which active intervention produces doubt about the level of fundamentals and, hence, how others will respond. Our analysis clarifies how financial contagion in Europe precipitated the sterling crisis of 1931.