Drei Probleme der Monopoltheorie

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Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations

Summary. Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurence of Condorcet cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of the latters are weak: among the n! possible orderings of n alternatives, more than one half are admissible within a domain. The resulting aggregated preference has then a neglectable probability of showing up cycles. We show moreover that the set of individual preferences can be `naturally' partitioned into two such domains. Received: June 17, 1996; revised version: April 15, 1997     

Mythical representations of trust in auditors and the preservation of social order in the financial community

The present paper investigates financial practitioners’ use and perception of audited financial statements. In-depth interviews, which we conducted with Canadian institutional investors, financial analysts and bankers, indicate: (1) a firm tendency to favour the quality of management over the content of financial statements in investment decisions and recommendation processes; and (2) a fundamental scepticism regarding the work of auditors. However, representations of auditor trustworthiness abound in formal texts surrounding the financial analysis domain—as if audited financial statements and the trust they convey towards numbers are indispensable to the work of financial analysts. Based on the work of Roland Barthes, we argue that financial practitioners’ trust in auditors constitutes a mythical representation whose main function is to maintain order and reproduce status quo within the financial system.     

On the satisfaction of peak demand in the certainty case

The concept of full-capacity flat-rate equilibrium is explored for a version of the Arrow-Debreu model with time-differentiated goods and production subject to a capacity constraint. The corresponding equilibrium allocations are shown to be inefficient in general. It is also shown that rationing peak demand is Pareto superior to non-rationing.     

How to boost frontline employee service recovery performance: the role of cultural intelligence

Service Business - Satisfying complaining customers is challenging, especially when dealing with the increasing number of customers with culturally diverse backgrounds. The purpose of this study is...     

Withholding investments in energy only markets: can contracts make a difference?

Although there are mechanisms to control market power in the spot market, withholding investments can still increase profits and hamper adequate capacity expansion. We examine the effect on investment of one suggested approach to reducing market power, contracting longer term. We construct a stylized model of an energy-only market where two firms, each specializing in one technology, invest in a first stage, contract part of their production in the second stage and sell the rest in the spot market in the third stage. We compare this model to one of an energy-only market having two stages, investment and a spot market. We find cases where the contracts change neither capacity nor peak prices, where the foreclosing effect of one player blocking the other from contracts markets increases investments and reduces prices, and where the opportunity to foreclose the market can incentivize one firm to lower its investment and increase its pricing power to the detriment of consumers. The model relies on the simplest possible assumptions of imperfect competition (subgame perfect equilibria with Cournot agents). We illustrate the different outcomes in a numerical example with two load steps (peak and off-peak) where we change one parameter, the height of the off-peak time segment. We find cases with increased and decreased capacity as well as no change in capacity. Since there is no general characterization of the consequences of contracts in this simple example, there can be no characterization in more complicated models that contain the market structures included here, and regulators or competition authorities cannot rely on contracts to induce sufficient capacity expansion by reducing market power. One other market mechanism that has been proposed to induce investment, a capacity auction with predetermined capacity requirements, is a potential alternative to limit market power that deserves further exploration to determine the extent to which it can provide an adequate incentive to invest in the presence of market power.     

Catching Growth Determinants with the Adaptive Lasso

Abstract. This paper uses the adaptive Lasso estimator to determine variables important for economic growth. The adaptive Lasso estimator is a computationally very efficient procedure that simultaneously performs model selection and parameter estimation. The computational cost of this method is negligibly small compared with standard approaches in the growth regressions literature. We apply this method for a regional dataset for the European Union covering the 255 NUTS2 regions in the 27 member states over the period 1995–2005. The results suggest that initial GDP per capita (with an implied convergence speed of about 1.5% per annum), human capital (proxied by the shares of highly and medium educated in the working age population), structural labor market characteristics (the initial unemployment rate and the initial activity rate of the low educated) as well as being a capital region are important for economic growth.     

Comparative Institutional Advantage and the Appropriate Development Model for Sub-Saharan Africa

The theory of comparative institutional advantage posits that certain types of firms locate production facilities in a particular location and avoid other locations due to unique institutional advantages and disadvantages. In sub-Saharan Africa, neoliberal policies, weak and corrupt states, and Transnational Corporations have created a particularly destructive variant of capitalism. African capitalism generates little in the way of economic growth, rewards mainly the TNC and the African elites, and undermines Africa’s economic future via activities that are utterly extractive in nature. African capitalism is facilitated directly by the WTO, the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank, and the institutional structures of African economies. After outlining the problems with African capitalism as currently structured, the paper goes on to suggest an alternative to this model involving experimental, embedded, grass roots development efforts that build on domestic cultural institutions that would generate significantly more positive outcomes for the people of sub-Saharan Africa. By abandoning neoliberal policies, it might be possible to create a better economic model that would build on community-centered institutional strengths to benefit a greater proportion of the population.