Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence

The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Additionally, observing others’ actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting.     

When salespeople develop negative headquarters stereotypes: performance effects and managerial remedies

This study examines the performance implications that organizations may suffer when their salespeople develop negative stereotypes of their corporate headquarters. How such stereotypes can be remedied through managerial action is also examined. The study draws on matched data from four different sources: sales managers, salespeople, customers, and company reports. Findings indicate that negative headquarters stereotypes among salespeople are associated with poor marketing-related performance across a range of outcomes, including salespeople’s adherence to corporate strategy, their customer orientation, and their sales performance. Findings also show that negative headquarters stereotypes can be remedied through managerial action, but more so at the corporate management level than at the sales unit level.     

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.     

Socialism and Intrafirm Asset Allocation

We rely on a survey of Swiss firms to document deviation from first‐best for reasons of internal ‘fairness’ when allocating resources. This ‘socialist’ practice is more widespread in smaller than in larger firms. It ignores the reputation and past performance of the managers who apply for funding, but takes into account their hierarchical position and their past use of resources. Socialism is only partially explained by concerns about empire building and managerial optimism, and it is not meant to benefit shareholders.     

On scales and decision-making based on arithmetic mean

The scales used in schools for the purpose of student assessment are ordinal. The average of ordinal values is often used for the evaluation and comparison of overall student performance. We demonstrate a theorem for the selection of scales invariant with respect to rank of average and compare scales according to this property. A uniformity criterion is also defined for the choice of the scale on which to calculate the average. Concatenated sets of grades from scales not belonging to the same category may bring about errors of rank and absurd averaging, which may have a heavy impact on related decision-making processes.