Increasing foreign supply of intermediates and less reliance on domestic resources: The production structure of the Swedish economy, 1957–1980

Historical comparisons of the Swedish production structure is undertaken in this paper. The total series of Swedish input-output data is, for the first time, exploited within the Leontief open static model and by use of the method of triangulation. Reliance on foreign supply of intermediates increased in the Swedish economy during the post-war period and the traditional dominance of production chains based on iron ores, forests and hydropower in the domestic supply of intermediates reduced in favour of chemical products and services. Also, labor employment declined significantly relative to the employment of capital in production. Some implications for the effects of aggregate economic policy are discussed.     

Consumer power: Enabling and limiting factors

A conceptual framework is developed for the study of factors that enable consumers to exert power, or prevent them from doing so, at different levels of aggregation and organization. The framework has four main categories: Constellation of Actors and Interests, Context of Interaction, Process of Interaction, and Outcomes. It is hoped that by means of such a framework, it will be possible to systematize and compare various cases in which attempts have been made — successfully or not so successfully — at exercising consumer influence. Such comparisons can provide the basis for hypotheses and generalizations as to factors that determine the outcomes of uses of consumer power or influence. The application of the framework is illustrated by means of a case study from Finland: that of a conflict between consumers and banks. Advantages and limitations of the approach are outlined in the final section.

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Die Macht der Verbraucher: förderliche und hinderliche Einflußfaktoren

Zusammenfassung Die Autoren entwickeln einen begrifflichen Bezugsrahmen zur Analyse der Faktoren, die Konsumenten auf verschiedenen Ebenen der Aggregation und der Organisation positiv oder negativ darin beeinflussen, Macht auszuüben. Der Bezugsrahmen hat vier Hauptkategorien: die Konstellation der Akteure und Interessen, der Zusammenhang der Interaktion zwischen den Akteuren, der Prozeß der Interaktion und die Ergebnisse.Die Autoren erhoffen sich von dem Bezugsrahmen die Möglichkeit einer Systematisierung und eines Vergleiches verschiedener Fälle, in denen die Ausübung von Konsumenteneinfluß versucht wurde — sei es mit oder ohne Erfolg. Solche Vergleiche können bei der Ableitung von Hypothesen und Verallgemeinerungen im Hinblick auf Faktoren nützlich sein, die den Erfolg der Ausübung von Konsumentenmacht beeinflussen. Die Anwendung des Bezugsrahmens wird beispielhaft an einer Fallstudie aus Finnland demonstriert, an einem Konflikt zwischen Konsumenten und Banken. Abschließend versucht der Beitrag die Vorteile und Grenzen des Ansatzes abzuschätzen.

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Sigmund Grønmo is Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, University of Bergen, Hans Holmboes gate 22, N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Folke Ölander is Professor of Economic Psychology, The Aarhus School of Business, Ryhavevej 8, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark.This paper is part of the output from a research project sponsored by the Consumer Policy Committee of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The project was carried out by the authors in collaboration with Arild Danielsen, Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, and we have drawn heavily on his erudition and insights in preparing this paper.The paper first appeared in Enhancing Consumer Choice, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Research in the Consumer Interest, Robert N. Mayer, Ed., American Council on Consumer Interests, Columbia, MO, 1991, and is published here with the permission of the ACCI and the Editor of the Proceedings.     

The Japanese saving rate between 1960 and 2000: productivity,policy changes,and demographics

In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model to study the factors generating the saving rate in Japan between 1960–2000. The model economy allows for observed aging of the population, total factor productivity (TFP), and fiscal policy to affect the national saving rate. Our calibrated general equilibrium setup generates saving rates that are reasonably similar to the data during this period. Our counterfactual experiments indicate that observed TFP growth rates are the main reason for both the secular decline and the two humps in the saving rate during 1960–2000.      

Computing open-loop noncooperative solution in discrete dynamic games

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new algorithm for the approximation of non-quadratic, non-linear open-loop Nash Cournot equilibrium in a difference game of fixed duration (multiperiod) and initial state. The algorithm based on adaptive search procedure called genetic algorithm has been used to optimize strategies for N-person dynamic games. Since genetic algorithms require little knowledge of the problem itself, computations based on these algorithms are very attractive to complex dynamic optimization problems. The empirical evidences are also provided to show the success of the algorithm developed. A typical example in US macroeconomic policy selection for 1933-1936 yields evidence of political inference in the economy.     

A life cycle analysis of social security

Summary We develop an applied general equilibrium model to examine the optimal social security replacement rate and the welfare benefits associated with it. Our setup consists of overlapping generations of 65-period lived individuals facing mortality risk and individual income risk. Private credit markets, including markets for private annuities, are closed by assumption. Unlike previous analyses, we find that an unfunded social security system may well enhance economic welfare. In our benchmark economy, the optimal social security replacement rate is 30%, and an empirically more plausible replacement rate of 60% raises welfare compared with an economy with no social security system.We would like to thank Andy Atkeson, V. V. Chari, Steve Davis, Paul Evans, Lars Hansen, Tim Kehoe, Nobu Kiyotaki, Ed Prescott, José-Victor Ríos-Rull, Richard Rogerson, Tom Sargent, Nancy Stokey, Dick Sweeney, Robert Townsend, and the participants of the NBER Economic Fluctuations Small Group Workshop on Micro and Macro Perspectives on the Aggregate Labor Market in Palo Alto, the NBER General Equilibrium Theory Conference in Minneapolis, the Money and Banking Workshop at the University of Chicago, and the NBER Summer Institute. An earlier version of this paper was titled A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Analysis of Social Security. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-9210291. We also thank the Minnesota and San Diego Supercomputer Centers for their support.     

Repeated moral hazard with persistence

Summary. This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome. The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized analytically and numerically. In particular, we show that persistence tends to make compensation less responsive to the first-period outcome. At the extreme, there are cases where the agent is perfectly insured against the first-period outcome: the agent obtains the same utility regardless of the first-period outcome. The model is extended to three periods. We also present a computational method to characterize an N-period model with two-period persistence.Received: 9 December 2003, Revised: 13 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D82, J31, J65. Correspondence to: Ayegül ahinWe are grateful to an anonymous referee, Jack Barron, Mark Bils, Hugo Hopenhayn, Per Krusell, Lance Lochner, Steve Williamson, and seminar participants at Concordia University, Purdue University, the applied theory meetings at University of Rochester, the Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2003, the Rochester Wegmans Conference 2002, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings 2003 for their comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Vera Brencic, Nancy Marmon, and Roxanne Stanoprud for excellent research assistance.     

Strategic Choices at Entry and Relative Survival Advantage of Cooperatives versus Corporations in the US Bio‐Ethanol Industry, 1978‐2015

The sustainability of cooperatives versus corporations is hotly contested. We propose that strategic choices at entry can help to explain the endurance of these two governance modes. We hypothesize that cooperatives have a survival advantage if their major drawback – high coordination costs – is curbed by high levels of member engagement at founding. Our analysis of survival rates in the US bio‐ethanol industry shows that cooperatives outlive corporations (1) if investment size at founding is large (strong financial engagement), (2) if they enter de novo instead of de alio (strong product‐market engagement) and (3) if the cooperative venture has been carefully planned from the start (greenfield entry) instead of built upon the acquisition of an existing plant (strong venture‐building engagement). These findings caution against the view that a particular mode of governance is superior or inferior to another in all circumstances.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.