首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   101篇
  免费   0篇
财政金融   8篇
工业经济   1篇
计划管理   19篇
经济学   30篇
综合类   1篇
旅游经济   1篇
贸易经济   24篇
农业经济   2篇
经济概况   15篇
  2022年   1篇
  2020年   2篇
  2019年   1篇
  2018年   4篇
  2017年   3篇
  2016年   3篇
  2015年   2篇
  2014年   4篇
  2013年   7篇
  2012年   8篇
  2011年   7篇
  2010年   7篇
  2009年   8篇
  2008年   5篇
  2007年   3篇
  2006年   4篇
  2005年   6篇
  2004年   3篇
  2003年   2篇
  2002年   1篇
  2001年   1篇
  1999年   1篇
  1997年   1篇
  1986年   1篇
  1985年   1篇
  1981年   1篇
  1980年   1篇
  1978年   1篇
  1976年   1篇
  1974年   3篇
  1972年   2篇
  1971年   1篇
  1969年   1篇
  1968年   1篇
  1963年   1篇
  1961年   1篇
  1956年   1篇
排序方式: 共有101条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
62.
    
In this paper, the core of a market game which constitutes the set of equilibria in the process of competitive contracting and recontracting is criticized as a solution concept for not being immune against c=\"/content/l47xv3726461402u/xxlarge8220.gif\" alt=\"ldquo\" align=\"MIDDLE\" BORDER=\"0\">theory absorptionc=\"/content/l47xv3726461402u/xxlarge8221.gif\" alt=\"rdquo\" align=\"MIDDLE\" BORDER=\"0\"> in the sense that knowledge of the core on part of the traders may result in a collusive stabilization of some dominated imputation. It is pointed out that a stable set (or, von Neumann-Morgenstern) solution does not suffer from this deficiency. Moreover, it is argued that stable set solutions provide an adequate analytical framework for the study of collusion, and are in this respect superior to the approach (relying on the core concept) chosen by Aumann in his work on disadvantageous monopolies. For symmetric bilateral market games — generated by markets involving the exchange of only two commodities, one of which also serves as a means of side payment and utility transfer, among two types of traders — with one seller and one up to three buyers all symmetric solutions are determined. Furthermore, a symmetric solution for markets with equal, but otherwise arbitrary, numbers of sellers and buyers is given. The symmetric stable sets of imputations are interpreted as rational standards of behavior providing the consistent and defensible rules of division necessary to make a cartel agreement viable.This research was partially supported by a grant given to New York University, Department of Economics, by the Office of Naval Research. (# N00014-76-C-0033). A first version of the paper was presented at the Third World Congress of the Eeconomtric Society, Toronto, Aug. 20–26, 1975, under the title c=\"/content/l47xv3726461402u/xxlarge8220.gif\" alt=\"ldquo\" align=\"MIDDLE\" BORDER=\"0\">Symmetric Solutions of Bilateral Market Gamesc=\"/content/l47xv3726461402u/xxlarge8221.gif\" alt=\"rdquo\" align=\"MIDDLE\" BORDER=\"0\">.  相似文献   
63.
    
Zusammenfassung Wir betrachten hier die Anwendung deterministischer und stochastischer Methoden auf Probleme der Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Verschiedene Versionen des deterministischen Programmierens (h. h. Fälle in denen keine zufälligen Variablen auftreten) werden zuerst behandelt. Wenn die Parameter der verschiedenen Versionen des deterministischen Programmierens zufällige Variable sind, haben wir stochastische Programme. Schließlich befaßt sich der letzte Abschnitt mit den Algorithmen für die Berechnung der Lösungen.
ckquote>On the application of deterministic and stochastic programming methods to problems of economicsckquote>ckquote>We consider here the application of deterministic and stochastic programming methods to problems of economics. Various versions of deterministic programming (i. e. cases in which there are no random variables) are treated first. If the parameters of the various forms of deterministic programming are random variables, we obtain stochastic programming. In the last paragraph we concern ourselves with algorithms for the calculation of solutions.ckquote>  相似文献   
64.
65.
66.
67.
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We consider two interesting cases of this problem: (1) the supply of each object is exactly one; and (2) the supply of an object may be greater than one. Our central requirements are strategy-proofness and ex post fairness. We propose a particular rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy (as well as equal treatment of equals). For the first case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. For the second case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy.  相似文献   
68.
69.
This study examines whether the stock prices of Turkish tourism companies respond to growth in eight macro-economic variables namely, consumer price index, imports, exchange rate, consumer confidence index, oil price, money supply, foreign tourist arrivals, and monthly stock market return. By applying the Granger causality procedure, we find that growth in the consumer confidence index and imports could Granger cause tourism companies’ stock returns among eight macro factors in Turkey during the 2005 to 2013 period. After considering the structural break that occurred in 2007, the pre-break results indicate that the consumer confidence index, exchange rate, and foreign tourist arrivals could Granger cause tourism stock returns. However, the results in the post-structural break period reveal that only growths in oil prices and imports are significant.  相似文献   
70.
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号