Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental study

Do people care about intentions – even when good intentions do not produce good results? In our experiments we find that rates of punishment and reward react strongly to intentions (the wage a firm decides to pay) and more modestly to distributional outcomes (the higher or lower wage actually received including the stochastic component). For example, workers who end up receiving medium wages respond much more positively when this resulted from the firm offering a high wage but bad luck lowered the worker's pay than when this resulted from the firm offering a low wage and good luck raised the pay.     

THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE RATE IN SINO-U.S. BILATERAL TRADE

We use the error component two-stage least squares estimation method to examine the effects of the Sino-U.S. exchange rate and the weighted exchange rate between the United States and other Asian countries on the Sino-U.S. trade patterns. Our study suggests that both the exchange rates have contributed to China's increased trade surplus with the United States. China has imported intermediate goods from the Asian countries, produced final goods using its cheap labor, and exported those goods to the United States. This is especially true for bilateral trade of high-tech manufacturing goods. Our study also reveals that the U.S. bilateral trade balance could improve if China appreciates its currency (Yuan) against the U.S. dollar. ( JEL F14, F10, F19)     

Intra-industry trade with multinational firms

Recent developments, including the analysis of firm-level adjustment to falling trade costs, have contributed to a revival of interest in intra-industry trade (IIT). Most empirical work still relies on the standard Grubel-Lloyd measure. This however refers only to international trade, disregarding income flows stimulated by repatriated profits of multinational firms. Given the overwhelming importance of the latter, this is a major shortcoming. This paper provides a guide to measurement and estimation of the determinants of bilateral IIT shares from the perspective of new trade theory with multinational firms. We develop an analytically solvable general equilibrium model to investigate the impact of investment costs, multinational activities and income flows from repatriated profits. We also discuss and quantify the bias of the Grubel-Lloyd index associated with repatriated profit flows of multinationals. Using bias-corrected versions of the Grubel-Lloyd index as the dependent variable, we demonstrate that the determinants motivated by our theoretical analysis offer important insights into variations in IIT shares.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.     

A note on the ecological-economic modelling of marine reserves in fisheries

This paper gives an overview of the bioeconomic modelling of marine reserves, and illustrates how economists have responded to the modelling results found in the ecological literature. The economic analysis is shown to be far more pessimistic with regards to the potential of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, than what one finds in the purely ecological analysis, the reason being the latter's neglect of issues such as discounting and economic incentive behaviour. However, economic analysis, despite some of it being relatively advanced with regards to spatiality, is still simplistic with regards to for instance ecosystem and habitat content. A simple expansion of the existing bioeconomic models with regards to positive habitat effects of area closures is presented and analysed, showing room for improved results from marine reserve implementation as compared to the existing analysis.     

Rich Nations, Poor Nations: How Much Can Multiple Equilibria Explain?

This paper asks whether the income gap between rich and poor nations can be explained by multiple equilibria. We explore the quantitative implications of a simple two-sector general equilibrium model that gives rise to multiplicity, and calibrate the model for 127 countries. Under the assumptions of the model, around a quarter of the world’s economies are found to be in a low output equilibrium. We also find that, since the output gains associated with an equilibrium switch are sizeable, the model can explain between 15 and 25% of the variation in the logarithm of GDP per worker across countries.