Fairness and the Unselfish Demand for Redistribution by Taxpayers and Welfare Recipients

We theoretically illustrate how the aversion to unfairness triggers an unselfish though rational demand for redistribution. This leads the well-off to demand positive tax rates and the “poor” to reject extreme progressivity. We prove that the “rich” and the “poor” adjust their demand for redistribution in opposite ways when their sensitivity to fairness increases: while agents with above average expected income raise their demand for redistribution, agents with below average income lower it. We then provide empirical evidence of these behaviors using a nationally representative survey from Italy. The estimates confirm that a stronger aversion to unfair distributive outcomes is associated with a higher support for redistribution by individuals with high income and to a lower demand for redistribution by those with low income.     

Government Policies Supporting Open Source Software for the Mass Market

This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source software (OSS). Mass-market consumers can be divided between those who are informed about the existence of OSS and those who are uninformed. Since OSS producers have little incentive to advertise, there may be a substantial mass of uniformed consumers, leading to market failures that may justify government intervention. We study three government policies: (a) mandated adoption, whereby the government forces public agencies, schools, and universities to adopt OSS, (b) information provision, whereby the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS, and (c) subsidy, whereby the government makes a payment to consumers if they adopt OSS. We show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare, but the subsidy always reduces it. When network externalities are added to the model, we show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare if they help the market to tip towards standardization. The web site www.opensource.org provides further details on the open source software movement     

Price levels and price dispersion within and across multiple retailer types: Further evidence and extension

In this article, the authors develop hypotheses on how prices and price dispersion compare among pure-play Internet, bricks-and-mortar (traditional), and bricks-and-clicks (multichannel) retailers and test them through an empirical analysis of data on the book and compact disc categories in Italy during 2002. Their results, based on an analysis of 13,720 prkce quotes, show that when posted prices are considered, traditional retailers have the highest prices, followed by multichannel retailers, and pure-play e-tailers, in that order. However, when shipping costs are included, multichannel retailers have the highest prices, followed by pure-play e-tailers and traditional retailers, in that order. With regard to price dispersion, pure-play e-tailers have the highest range of prices, but the lowest standard deviation. Multichannel retailers have the highest standard deviation in prices with or without shipping costs. These findings suggest that online markets offer opportunities for retailers to differentiate within and across the retailer types. SDA Bocconi Graduate School of Management Fabio Ancarani (fabio.ancarani@sdabocconi.it) is an assistant professor of marketing at SDA Bocconi University’s School of Management, Milan, Italy. He has been a visiting scholar at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland at College Park. His teaching and research interests are related to marketing strategies in the digital economy. His research has been published in journals such as the theJournal of Interactive Marketing and theEuropean Management Journal. Venkatesh Shankar (vshankar@rhsmith.umd.edu) is a Ralph J. Tyser Fellow and an associate professor of marketing in the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland at College Park. His areas of reseach are e-business, competitive strategy, international marketing, pricing, new product management, and supply chain management. His research has been published or is forthcoming in theJournal of Marketing Research, Marketing Science, theJournal of Marketing, Strategic Management Journal, theJournal of Retailing, theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, theJournal of Public Policy and Marketing, andMarketing Letters. He is co-editor of theJournal of Interactive Marketing; associate editor ofManagement Science; and serves on the editorial boards ofMarketing Science, theJournal of Marketing, theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, theJournal of Retailing, and theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science. He is a three-time winner of the Krowe Award for Outstanding Teaching and teaches Marketing Management, Digital Business Strategy, Competitive Marketing Strategy, and International Marketing (http://www.venkyshankar.com).     

Career Concerns and Product Market Competition

This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second effect is privately valuable to firms, but is socially wasteful. As a result, equilibrium pay for talent can be inefficiently high and career concerns too strong. Explicit incentive contracts do not solve the problem, but equilibrium pay is reduced if managerial skills have firm‐specific components, or if firms are heterogeneous. In this second case, managers are efficiently assigned to firms, but equilibrium pay reflects the profitability of talent outside the efficient allocation. The effect of increased competition is ambiguous in general, and depends on the profit sensitivity to cost reductions. This ambiguity is illustrated in two examples of commonly used models of imperfect competition.     

Trade structure and economic growth

Abstract

How do the number of trade partners and the concentration of trade among partners affect the economic growth of a country? We refer to these characteristics as the structure of trade, and explore this question empirically in this study. We find that the structure of trade, independently of the level of trade itself, has an important effect on the rate of economic growth. The results of the study suggest that the number of trading partners is positively correlated with growth across all countries, and this effect is more pronounced for rich countries. Trade concentration is positively correlated with growth for all countries, and the effect is concentrated in poor countries. Previous work has overlooked these characteristics of trade, although we find them to be quite relevant and that they could lead to new ways of understanding the trade – growth relationship.     

The Drivers of E-tailers' Price Levels

One of the most important topics in online pricing is understanding the drivers of online price levels for different types of retailers, in order to better understand competition across retail channels. We developed a conceptual framework and conducted an empirical analysis on price levels in the books category among different e-tailers (pure play and multichannel) in Italy and obtained a dataset comprising 5,400 price quotes during 2002. We ran a correlation analysis that showed that e-tailer graphics, branding and trust, and shipping services are highly correlated to price levels. Moreover, we developed a regression analysis that showed that first impact attributes like graphics and navigability are the most important drivers of online price levels. We identify some areas of future research and offer some managerial insights.     

Venture capital investor type and the growth mode of new technology-based firms

Independent venture capital (IVC) investors have more powerful incentives than corporate venture capital (CVC) investors to take actions that signal their capabilities (i.e. to “grandstand”). We argue that this should engender differences in the treatment effect of IVC and CVC on the mode of growth of portfolio companies. Short-term sales growth of IVC-backed firms in the period that immediately follows the VC investment should outpace that of CVC-backed firms, while we expect no difference in employment growth. We find support for these theoretical predictions on a sample of 531 Italian new technology-based firms, using several panel estimators to control for endogeneity of IVC and CVC.