Measuring ‘indirect’ investments in ICT in OECD countries

ABSTRACT

ICT components, such as microprocessors, may be embodied in other capital goods not recorded as ICT in National Accounts. We name ‘indirect ICT investment’ the value of embodied ICT components in non-ICT investment. The paper provides estimates of ‘indirect ICT investment’ based on detailed and unpublished Supply-Use tables (SUT) in 12 OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Our main finding is that ICT investment appears significantly higher when considering its indirect component, the average increase being about 35%. The inclusion of indirect ICT investment, excluding software (for which firms’ expenditures are difficult to measure), changes significantly the relative position of countries with respect to the ICT intensity of their investments. The inclusion of software further increases indirect ICT investment but the increase is smaller (in percentage) than without this inclusion. A final result, but concerning only three countries, it that the diagnosis of a stabilisation, or even a decrease, of ICT investment in percentage of GDP or of total investment, observed from the beginning of the century, is not modified if we take into account the indirect ICT investment.     

Dynamics of fine wine and asset prices: evidence from short- and long-run co-movements

This article examines short- and long-term price linkages among the majority of fine wine and equity markets over the period of 2003 to 2012. We do not consider the price index (LIV-EX 100 or 500), as is typically undertaken in previous studies, but rather examine the auction price series of the world’s most traded wine-vintage pairs (5 Bordeaux first growth, 8 Bordeaux second growth, 5 Burgundy, 3 Rhone, 4 Italian, 5 Californian, 1 Australian and 1 Portuguese). A global equity index is also included using the Morgan Stanley Capital International World. Cointegration procedures, the Granger non-causality test, and ECM are used to analyse short- and long-run relationships among these markets. The results indicate a strong effect of financial markets on wine prices and short-term causality for certain wines. Moreover, the findings indicate short-run causality between the wines themselves, revealing a leader (exogenous) or follower (endogenous) status of certain fine wines in price dynamics, and also long-run causality for endogenous wines. This approach is relevant to portfolio diversification strategies and allows price movements to be anticipated more accurately than using an index approach.     

美国供应链信息披露新法规涉及冲突矿产

金融危机爆发以后,美国国会通过了多德·弗兰克金融改革法案以改革金融体系。除了针对金融机构,该法案也包含了一个对更多行业将会产生巨大影响的条款,内容涉及冲突性地区金属矿产的获取。从2013年开始,许多在美国上市的公司必须对美国证券委员会提交关于企业供应链来源的报告,这一新的信息披露要求,对企业提出了一个复杂的责任问题。     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

Advancing Integrative Social Contracts Theory: A Habermasian Perspective

We critically assess integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) and show that the concept particularly lacks of moral justification of substantive hypernorms. By drawing on Habermasian philosophy, in particular discourse ethics and its recent application in the theory of deliberative democracy, we further advance ISCT and show that social contracting in business ethics requires a well-justified procedural rather than a substantive focus for managing stakeholder relations. We also replace the monological concept of hypothetical thought experiments in ISCT by a concept of practical discourse to better govern business activities on the macro-level of organizational actors such as firms, governments, and NGOs.     

On Functionally Distributed Quotas

We consider “functionally distributed” quotas, where trade is restricted to a function of another economic activity, paying special attention to the ratio constraint and its relation to “proportionally distributed” quotas. We propose a simple principle defining the optimal policy under a functionally defined restriction, extend the analysis of ratio import/production constraints to general equilibrium, introduce export constraints, and constraints defined in proportion to factor use. We develop the general‐equilibrium geometry of functional trade constraints and the concomitant optimal policies, deriving a “quota locus” that depicts the consumption possibilities under various regimes.     

Preemption,leapfrogging and competition in patent races

This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Undersome conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘?-preemption’ is shown to depend on whether a firm that is behind in the patent race, as measured by the expected time remaining until discovery, cant ‘leapfrog’ the competition and become the new leader. An example of an R&D game with random discovery illustrates how ?-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is impossible. A multi-stage R&D process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A similar conclusion emerges in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring of rival firms' R&D investment activities.     

New technology: old industrial sociology?

This article argues that studies of the introduction of new technology have tended to ignore the contributions of pre-Braverman approaches. However, in some cases, they have implicitly rediscovered the findings of an older industrial sociology.