Pseudo conditional maximum likelihood estimation of the dynamic logit model for binary panel data

We show how the dynamic logit model for binary panel data may be approximated by a quadratic exponential model. Under the approximating model, simple sufficient statistics exist for the subject-specific parameters introduced to capture the unobserved heterogeneity between subjects. The latter must be distinguished from the state dependence which is accounted for by including the lagged response variable among the regressors. By conditioning on the sufficient statistics, we derive a pseudo conditional likelihood estimator of the structural parameters of the dynamic logit model, which is simple to compute. Asymptotic properties of this estimator are studied in detail. Simulation results show that the estimator is competitive in terms of efficiency with estimators recently proposed in the econometric literature.     

Resale and Collusion in A Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods

The paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second‐hand markets. It will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper shows that an active second‐hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude, as do policies that affect the functioning of the second‐hand market (e.g., leasing policy and buy‐back). It will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits.     

Politics with(out) Coase

Political markets may be curative of political externalities, yet they are often unviable due to the presence of bargaining externalities. In this paper, we study the extent to which the choice of voting dimensions may affect the viability of Coasian bargaining in a political context. The results suggest that bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space, although desirable in an ideal world of zero-transaction costs, is almost unavoidably affected by bargaining externalities. Disaggregating the policy choices and voting in a one-dimensional policy space can reduce bargaining externalities and lead to median voter outcomes. Bargaining by a limited number of players in a median voter situation can achieve a social first-best. We show the equivalence between the outcomes of multiple independent voting in one-dimensional space and the hypothetical outcome of Coasian bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space.     

Assembling resources when forming a new business

Every business builds on a specific set of resources. New businesses in particular have to assemble external resources that are mostly new to them. This resource assembly requires developing business relationships with other actors that control and can provide the needed resources. Adopting a resource interaction perspective, this paper examines a case of a new business venture in the automobile industry. The case study shows that when forming a new business the actors possess only partial knowledge of how to assemble the resources. Consequently, the actors must engage in extensive adaptation and interaction with others to enact workable resource interfaces and combinations. This necessity makes the new business formation process nonlinear and onerous. Further, the case demonstrates that new business formation is a collective process involving not only the emergence of a formal business organization but also reorganizing the applicable resource market. Since third parties involved in developing the necessary resource combinations can be considered part of the new business venture, setting the boundaries of the new venture becomes arbitrary. The arbitrary nature of such boundary setting has implications in entrepreneurship studies with regard to the unit of analysis and the concept of opportunity.     

Medical technology and the production of health care

This article investigates the factors that determine differences across OECD countries in health outcomes, using data on life expectancy at age 65, over the period 1960 to 2007. We estimate a production function where life expectancy depends on health and social spending, lifestyle variables, and medical innovation. Our first set of regressions include a set of observed medical technologies by country. Our second set of regressions proxy technology using a spatial process. This article also tests whether in the long-run countries tend to achieve similar levels of health outcomes. Our results show that health spending has a significant and mild effect on health outcomes, even after controlling for medical innovation. However, its short-run adjustments do not seem to have an impact on health care productivity. Spatial spill overs in life expectancy are significant and point to the existence of interdependence across countries in technology adoption. Furthermore, nations with initial low levels of life expectancy tend to catch up with those with longer-lived populations.     

A note on the POUM effect with heterogeneous social mobility

We study the determinants of the (steady-state) POUM effect in a model where the individuals evaluate their expected future income using both their current income and observable characteristics such as education, race or gender.     

A Social Dimension for a New Industrial Strategy for Europe

Intereconomics - The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has not been equal across economic sectors, age groups, education levels and employment status.     

Using Relational and Transactional MCSs to Manage the Delivery of Outsourced Public Services: Evidence from Twelve Cases in the USA

The successful management of the purchaser–provider relationship is essential for the effective delivery of public services, and entails the use of both transactional and relational approaches. We herein analyse the degree and complementarity of transactional and relational management control systems in the management of purchaser–provider relationships for the successful delivery of public services using evidence from 12 US case studies. We demonstrate that transactional and relational management control systems are controlled differently in order to improve contracting efficiency. We also show how a combination of these management control systems offers a framework for structured public accountability and service flexibility.