Business Ethics East vs. West: Myths and Realities

The West has a stereotypical image of businesses, officials, and politicians, etc., in the East (Third World) countries being pervasively corrupt while it views itself as being almost completely uncorrupt. One closer look, however, realities turn out to be quite different. Business corruption is much more universal that Westerners are generally willing to accept. The major differences are that corruption in the East is practiced so blatantly that it makes major news. Western businesses, on the other hand, have, over time, developed sophisticated techniques whereby corruption becomes almost invisible. This paper discusses the myths and realities of Eastern versus Western corruption and discusses several means which have allowed Western companies to exploit others through subtle and, almost invisible means. The overall advantage, however, still goes to the West where petty corruption has been pretty much eliminated.     

Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.     

Fee competition among Big 4 auditors and audit quality

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Both the GAO (Public accounting firms: mandated study on consolidation and competition. GAO, Washington, 2003; Audits of public companies: continued...     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Business,government, and the science of human settlements

In this time of decaying cities and mounting pressures in technological societies, more alternatives and innovative solutions are needed for men to be able to respond to their rapidly changing world. Piecemeal programs (such as public housing) have failed dismally. A new discipline, ekistics, has developed a framework for dealing with problems in human settlements. It takes into account five basic elements of communities: nature, man, society, structures, and networks. Since business and government are such pervasive forces, the author suggests that they cooperate to improve the functioning of our society. To do this, planners can adapt the ekistic framework to society's needs, as well as the universal view of the discipline itself.