No premature closures of debates,please: A response to Ahrens

In this response to Ahrens [Ahrens, T. (2008). Overcoming the subjective–objective divide in interpretive management accounting research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(2–3), 292–297.] we clarify both the motivation and the core points of the Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. [Kakkuri-Knuuttila, M.-L., Lukka, K., & Kuorikoski, J. (2008). Straddling between paradigms: A naturalistic philosophical case study on interpretive research in management accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(2–3), 267–291.] paper. We remind the management accounting academia that we should be careful not to close prematurely examinations and debates on issues, which are not yet truly resolved.     

Biosecurity in agriculture: an economic analysis of coexistence of professional and hobby production*

One component of biosecurity is protection against invasive alien species, which are one of the most important threats worldwide to native biodiversity and economic profitability in various sectors, including agriculture. However, agricultural producers are not homogeneous. They may have different objectives and priorities, use different technologies, and occupy heterogeneous parcels of land. If the producers differ in terms of their attitude towards invasive pests and the damages they cause, there are probably external effects in the form of pest spread impacts and subsequent damages caused. We study such impacts in the case of two producer types: profit‐seeking professional producers and utility‐seeking hobby producers. We show that the hobby producer, having first set a breeding ground for the pest, under‐invests in pest control. We also discuss potential policy instruments to correct this market failure and highlight the importance of considering different stakeholders and their heterogeneous incentives when designing policies to control invasive alien species.     

Establishment size and task-specific wages: Evidence from historical contract data

This study examines whether task-specific jobs are rewarded differently across establishments of different sizes and whether these rewards vary across distinct technologies. We found that the aggregate premium estimates on the impact of size on wages conceal significant differences between tasks and technologies and that these differences reflect unobserved individual heterogeneity. The role of self-selection of more productive workers into larger establishments is particularly substantial in the case of abstract tasks.     

Vox Populi,Vox Dei? Tacit collusion in politics

We study competition between political parties in repeated elections with probabilistic voting. This model entails multiple equilibria, and we focus on cases where political collusion occurs. When parties hold different opinions on some policy, they may take different policy positions that do not coincide with the median voter's preferred policy platform. In contrast, when parties have a mutual understanding on a particular policy, their policy positions may converge (on some dimension) but not to the median voter's preferred policy. That is to say, parties can tacitly collude with one another, despite political competition. Collusion may collapse, for instance, after the entry of a new political party. This model rationalizes patterns in survey data from Sweden, where politicians on different sides of the political spectrum take different positions on economic policy but similar positions on refugee intake—diverging from the average voter's position, but only until the entry of a populist party.