The economics of dying: A misapplication of tools

Conclusions Unlike McKenzie and Tullock, we do not know how personsshould treat their bodily organs or what is an ideal exit. That depends upon their utility goals, which are defined in output terms specific to the decision maker. We contend that the body is an input into the utility production process, and therefore, as with any input, it must be maintained and repaired at a level consistent with the output goals for maximization of utility. Thus, from this framework, it is quite consistent for a person to die with healthy organs without any thought of belief in reincarnation or the desire to bequeath one's bodily organs to others, or religious values. Self interest is all that must prevail.Also, the fact that there are interrelationships between the organs in the system, and at points these relationships take on fixed factor characteristics such that reduced levels of operation in one organ can create disorientation or coma or damage to other organs, means that the body cannot die as M-T suggest. Zero capacity for all organs at death is a technical impossibility as well as being inconsistent with the output goals of utility maximizers.     

Frictions, Heterogeneity and Optimality in Mortgage Modeling

The purpose of this article is to provide a unified framework for incorporating frictions into a theoretical options-pricing model (OPM) for mortgages. This article presents formulation for a frictions-adjustable mortgage model that integrates borrower heterogeneity while simultaneously preserving prepayment and default financial decisions. Our model demonstrates the flexibility of the OPM by simulating separate and concurrent effects of three categories of frictions on the mortgage and mortgage components. Researchers can use our example formulation to determine the effects of specific borrower characteristics on mortgage values without destroying the options theoretic framework.     

The measurement of corporate portfolio strategy: analysis of the content validity of related diversification indexes

Measures developed for the analysis of corporate diversification have become fundamental to a broad range of strategy research. This paper examines the content validity of the two most widely used continuous measures of related diversification—the related component of the entropy index and the concentric index—and raises fundamental questions about their validity as indicators of portfolio relatedness. These questions are not driven by the use of SIC data for estimation of the indexes; they involve validity problems intrinsic to the construction of the measures. The related component of entropy and the concentric index are sensitive to features of corporate portfolio composition that may not be directly linked to portfolio relatedness. These sensitivities can create important ambiguities in strategy research. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A taxonomy of internationally dispersed technology units and its application to management issues

Internationally dispersed technology units are classified using a system based upon three clearly defined dimensions: Type of technical work (research, development or support); functional areas with which the technology unit collaborates in its work (marketing, manufacturing, marketing and manufacturing, or none); and geographic area of collaboration (local, international). The resulting eight category taxonomy is shown to provide an improved platform for organizing and integrating the literature on the management of internationally dispersed technology units and for articulating theoretical issues in ongoing programs of empirical research.     

The effects of funding source and management ownership on the productivity of R&D

This study investigates the influence of the source of R&D funds and management ownership on R&D productivity. The lagged effect of the source of R&D funds on R&D output is investigated for a sample of US manufacturing firms in five industries over the 1996–99 period. Estimates based on 779 firm-years show that R&D productivity increases with the proportion of stock held by managers and directors of firms primarily in the Other Electronics industry. The estimates also show that recipients of government-sponsored R&D funds in the Chemicals industry have lower levels of output (sales) for each dollar committed to R&D. In addition, output for firms in the Chemicals industry worsens as management stockholding increases, implying an agency cost rationale for the observed difference in output. The implication is that firms with high manager-owner content are less productive with government-sponsored R&D than with company-financed R&D. The reported results suggest that potential agency costs should be incorporated in government-sponsored R&D contracts. It also suggests that the source of R&D funds should be disclosed and incorporated into the valuation of intangible assets attributable to research and development.