Budget deficits and real interest rates: Updated empirical evidence on causality

Using error-correction model (ECM) estimation, the paper empirically examines the causality relationship between the federal government budget deficit and the ex ante real interest rate yield on high grade long term tax free municipal bonds in the U.S. To clarify this deficit or interest rate relationship, the budget deficit is measured by the primary budget deficit, which excludes net interest payments by the Treasury. In a model that includes federal personal income tax rates and net international capital flows, as well as money supply growth, the ECM estimates strongly suggest a bi-directional relationship between the primary budget deficit and the ex ante real interest rate yield. Budget deficits apparently do matter! William Simon's concerns were justified.The author is indebted to P. A. V. B. Swamy for ideas and helpful suggestions and Will Perry for data assembly and processing.     

Time Series Concepts for Conditional Distributions*

The paper asks the question – as time series analysis moves from consideration of conditional mean values and variances to unconditional distributions, do some of the familiar concepts devised for the first two moments continue to be helpful in the more general area? Most seem to generalize fairly easy, such as the concepts of breaks, seasonality, trends and regime switching. Forecasting is more difficult, as forecasts become distributions, as do forecast errors. Persistence can be defined and also common factors by using the idea of a copula. Aggregation is more difficult but causality and controllability can be defined. The study of the time series of quantiles becomes more relevant.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.