Call Options and Liquidation in Commercial Mortgage Financing

This paper models a commercial real estate project where a wealth-constrained manager uses outside debt financing to purchase a project who's return depends on future economic conditions and the manager's investment in the project. It is shown that it is inefficient to finance the project with callable debt. This prediction is consistent with observed real estate financing practice. I also model the outcome of financial distress allowing for (1) debt forgiveness, (2) equity in exchange for debt forgiveness, and (3) foreclosure. The model motivates (1) why commercial real estate loans are often foreclosed, and (2) why lenders foreclose assets at fire-sale prices.     

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF RELATIONSHIP MAGNITUDE

Based upon a review of the extant literature, it is proposed that the structure of an interorganizational relationship is composed of relationship type and the under‐researched construct of relationship magnitude. Specifically, it is hypothesized that relationship magnitude, a second order construct composed of trust, commitment, and dependence, affects relationship type, which affects the perception of value of the relationship. The results of a survey analyzed through structural equation modeling support these hypotheses.     

Decomposition of Fraud‐Risk Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity to Fraud Cues*

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.     

Spatial determinants of Japanese FDI in China

Research on foreign direct investment in China has spawned an increasingly large literature. Whilst regional cleavages with respect to the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) are acknowledged, empirical research on the spatial determinants of FDI in China has been limited. Furthermore, research on the spatial determinants of home country FDI in China has thus far been neglected due to difficulties in accessing the appropriate data. The objective of this paper is to examine the spatial determinants of Japanese direct investment in China by using an econometric model. To that purpose, a dataset is created from the Toyo Keizai directory on the overseas activities of Japanese companies. The results show that tertiary education, inland waterways, as well as coastal location are positive and significant determinants of Japanese investment in China.     

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Endogenous Group Formation

While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in exogenously fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public‐goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry/exit, restricted entry with free exit, and free entry with restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group‐level outcomes.     

Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing

This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.      

Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.