DOES WORKSHARING WORK? SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE IAB‐ESTABLISHMENT PANEL

Recent policy debate in Europe suggests that a shorter workweek will lead to more jobs (worksharing). We derive and estimate a model where the firm employs two types of workers, some working overtime, the rest standard hours. Worksharing is not always a prediction of the theory. Using German establishment‐level panel data (the IAB‐ESTABLISHMENT panel), 1993–1999, we find no evidence of pro‐worksharing effects except in small plants in the East German non‐service sector. There is evidence that a cut in standard hours lowers the proportion of overtime workers in a plant, as predicted by the theory, and increases the proportion of standard‐time plants.     

Cooperation by Asymmetric Agents in a Joint Project

The object of study is cooperation in joint projects where agents may have different desired sophistication levels for the project and where some of the agents may have low budgets. In this context, questions concerning the optimal realizable sophistication level and the distribution of the related costs among the participants are tackled. A related cooperative game, the enterprise game, and a non‐cooperative game, the contribution game, are both helpful. It turns out that there is an interesting relation between the core of the convex enterprise game and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Special attention is paid to a new rule inspired by the Baker–Thompson rule in the airport landing fee literature. For this rule, the project is split up in a sequence of subprojects where the involved participants pay amounts which are, roughly speaking, equal, but not more than their budgets allow. The resulting payoff distribution turns out to be a core element of the related enterprise game.     

NOVELTY EFFECTS OF NEW FACILITIES ON ATTENDANCE AT PROFESSIONAL SPORTING EVENTS

We investigate the effect of new facilities on attendance in professional baseball, basketball, and football from 1969 to 2001. We find a strong, persistent effect in baseball and basketball, and little effect in football. Size and duration estimates imply that baseball teams sell 2,500,794 additional tickets over the first eight seasons, basketball teams 293,878 over the first nine seasons, and football teams 137,792 over the first five seasons, implying an increase in revenues that could defray public subsidies that state and local governments provide for new sports construction projects. Rough calculations suggest that stadium subsidies are an inefficient method of subsidizing professional sports franchises. (JEL R39 , D12 , L83 )     

Control of SO2 emissions from power plants: A case of induced technological innovation in the U.S.

This paper investigates how the details of government actions induce innovation—the overlapping activities of invention, adoption and diffusion, and learning by doing—in “environmental technology,” products and processes that either control pollutant emissions or prevent emissions altogether. It applies multiple quantitative and qualitative measures of innovation to a case subject to several “technology-push” and “demand-pull” instruments: sulfur dioxide control technology for power plants. The study employs analyses of public R&D funding, patents, expert interviews, learning curves, conference proceedings, and experience curves. Results indicate that: regulation and the anticipation of regulation stimulate invention; technology-push instruments appear to be less effective at prompting invention than demand-pull instruments; and regulatory stringency focuses inventive activity along certain technology pathways. Increased diffusion of the technology results in significant and predictable operating cost reductions in existing systems, as well as notable efficiency improvements and capital cost reductions in new systems. Government plays an important role in fostering knowledge transfer via technical conferences, as well as affecting the pattern of collaborative relationships within the technical research community via regulatory changes that affect the market for the technology. Finally, the case provides little evidence for the claim that cap-and-trade instruments induce innovation more effectively than other instruments.     

Rational expectations for large CGE models: A practical algorithm and a policy application

We describe a simple iterative method for solving large dynamic CGE models under rational expectations. Details are given for Australia's MONASH model but the approach applies to a wide range of CGE models. The method is automated in the RunMONASH Windows software, putting CGE modelling under rational expectations within the reach of non-specialist modellers. We provide an illustrative application in which MONASH results under rational expectations are compared with results under static expectations. The application and supporting software can be downloaded. Results from the application are interpreted in terms of elementary economic mechanisms.     

The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision

Modern economic theory ignores the influence of emotions on decision-making. Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory processes, including those that express themselves in emotions and feelings. This influence can occur at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur consciously, and some of which occur non-consciously. Here we review studies that confirm various predictions from the hypothesis, and propose a neural model for economic decision, in which emotions are a major factor in the interaction between environmental conditions and human decision processes, with these emotional systems providing valuable implicit or explicit knowledge for making fast and advantageous decisions.     

Deconstructing the law of effect

Do the consequences of past behavior alter future policy, as the law of effect assumes? Or, are behavioral policies based on behaviorally produced information about the state of the world, but not themselves subject to change? In the first case, stable policies are equilibria discovered by trial and error, so adjustments to abrupt changes in the environment must proceed slowly. In the second, adjustments can be as abrupt as the environmental changes. Matching behavior is the robust tendency of subjects to match the relative time and effort they invest in different foraging options to the relative incomes derived from them. Measurement of the time course of adjustments to step changes in the reward-scheduling environment show that adjustments can be as abrupt as the changes that drive them, and can occur with the minimum possible latency. Broader implications for theories about the role of experience in behavior are discussed.     

The Delphi method, impeachment and terrorism: Accuracies of short-range forecasts for volatile world events

Two experiments examined the effects of iterated polling and feedback on prediction accuracy for volatile world events using the Delphi paradigm. In both experiments, participants predicted rapidly changing geopolitical events. The first experiment occurred during the litigation surrounding the Clinton/Lewinsky affair in 1998. Results indicated that feedback improved individual and group accuracy for predictions of whether an event would occur. These types of predictions derived from group consensus were approximately 90% accurate, which was significantly higher than the average individual participant's accuracy. Neither polling nor feedback had much effect on time course predictions. The second experiment occurred during the American military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In Experiment 2, participants were polled three times to determine if increasing the number of iterated polls would improve Delphi accuracy. The results showed that accuracy improved from the first to the second poll but not from the second to the third. The groups predicted whether these scenarios would occur with approximately 75% accuracy, which was significantly higher than the accuracy of any individual participant. Once again, the Delphi procedure did not enhance time course predictions in Experiment 2.