Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.     

The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are the most frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent without role uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with role uncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse and Competitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of Social Welfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to 21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additional treatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in the experiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctly understand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions were most frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim to measure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.     

Gender wage gap studies: consistency and decomposition

This paper reviews the empirical literature on the gender wage gap, with particular attention given to the identification of the key parameters in human capital wage regression models. This is of great importance in the literature for two main reasons. First, the main explanatory variables in the wage model, i.e., measures of work experience and time-out-of-work, are endogenous. As a result, applying traditional estimators may lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Second, empirical evidence on the gender wage gap hinges on estimates of the parameters of interest. Accordingly, their economic meaning may be limited by restrictive assumptions included in wage models. This challenges both researchers and policymakers who require precise measures of the gender wage gap in order to create and enforce efficient equality policies. This paper is a substantially revised version of the first chapter of my thesis. I am grateful to Christian Dustmann and Wendy Carlin for their great support and comments. I also thank Bernd Fitzenberger, colleagues at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and IZA, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

A social morality for mortals: A review essay of <Emphasis Type="Italic">the order of public reason: A theory of freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world</Emphasis>

This essay praises Gerald Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason as a building block for all normative explorations into the institutional foundations of human sociability. It evaluates the normative implications put forth by Gaus in terms of the Kirzner’s “finder’s keeper’s ethic.” This raises a question about the relationship between the moral order and the political order that underlies market processes. Examining the role of entrepreneurship in the market process in relation to Kirzner’s “finder’s keeper’s principle” suggests a deeper ethical foundation that underpins the institutional conditions of “social morality.”     

China’s house price: Affected by economic fundamentals or real estate policy?

Many theory and empirical literature conclude that house price can reflect economic fundamentals in the long-term. However, by using China’s panel data of 35 main cities stretching from 1998 to 2007, we find that there is no stable relationship between house price and economic fundamentals. House price has deviated upward from the economic fundamentals since government started macro-control of the real estate market. We consider that the mechanism between the house price and economic fundamentals is distorted by China’s real estate policy, especially its land policy. Meanwhile the policy itself is an important factor in explaining the changes of China’s house price. Then we estimate the dynamic panel data model on house price and the variables which are controlled by real estate policy. The result shows: land supply has negative effects on house price; financial mortgages for real estate have positive effects on house price; and the area of housing sold and the area of vacant housing, which reflects the supply and demand of the housing market, has negative effects on house price. We also find some differences in house price influence factor between eastern and mid-western cities. Finally, we propose policy suggestions according to the empirical results.     

What is unemployment in Europe? Concepts and measurement in the European community household panel

The purpose in this article is to evaluate the consistency between two measures of unemployment in a cross-country context. We use the European Community Household Panel to identify unemployment at an individual level based as well on the ILO criteria for being classified as unemployed as on the individual respondent reporting to be unemployed. This opens a unique opportunity to compare unemployment measured in two different ways based on a cross European Union panel study covering the years 1994 to 2001. The two main questions addressed in this article are to which extent the two unemployment measures differ and whether transition rates out of unemployment depend on which concept we use. Both questions are answered in the affirmative. The overall conclusion is that it is important, especially in some of the EU countries, to include both measures of unemployment as guidelines and indicators for policy.     

Social status,human capital formation and the long-run effects of money

This study examines the effects of monetary policy in a two-sector cash-in-advance economy of human capital accumulation. Agents concern about their social status represented by the relative physical capital and relative human capital. We find that if the desire for social status depends only on relative physical capital, money is superneutral in the growth-rate sense. However, if the desire for social status depends on relative human capital, the money growth rate will have a positive effect on the long-run economic growth rate. Furthermore, an increase in the desire to pursue human capital will raise the long-run growth rate, but an increase in the desire to pursue physical capital will lower it.