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151.
152.
This empirical note extends the recent work by Holmes (2006) in examining the long-run relationship between private and public
savings in the U.S. over the post-World War II period. Standard Engle-Granger cointegration tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration; however, once allowance is made for an endogenous break in the cointegrating relationship,
the weak form of the Ricardian equivalence proposition is supported. 相似文献
153.
Sophie Manigart Veroniek Collewaert Mike Wright Sarika Pruthi Andy Lockett Hans Bruining Ulrich Hommel Hans Landstrom 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2007,3(1):109-125
We examine the neglected area of internationalisation by VCs. Using a representative sample of 195 VCs, we show that the decision
of a European VC firm to invest internationally is driven by its human resources. Having more VC executives in general and
more VC executives with previous international experience in specific, results in a higher probability of investing internationally.
In contrast, more VC executives with experience in the VC industry or with an engineering background lead to a higher probability
of remaining domestic. 相似文献
154.
The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules
and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party
alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political
environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider
our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature.
Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected
to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Public Choice Society Meetings. The authors would like to thank
the conference participants, William Shughart, Charles Register, Jocelyn Evans, John D. Jackson, Amihai Glazer, and two anonymous
referees for their comments. We would also like to thank Craig R. Stiller for his help in the collection of data. Any remaining
errors remain the responsibility of the authors. 相似文献
155.
This paper has three goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production and duality analysis
can be used to provide a comprehensive and general treatment of the value of information for a risk-averse firm with expected-utility
(linear-in-probabilities) preferences and a general stochastic technology. Second, we place bounds on the value of information
for a risk-averse firm and relate these bounds to characteristics of the technology and the producer’s preferences. The third
and final goal is to derive the implications that information differences can have for measured efficiency differences and
to relate the bounds on the value of information to those measured differences.
相似文献
156.
Trade intensity,country size and corruption 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity
is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical
links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample
selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors
have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed.
We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially
increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples
less subject to selection bias.
Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002
We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance,
and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are
not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 相似文献
157.
J. Castellano-Paulis A. Hernández-Mendo Verónica Morales-Sánchez M. T. Anguera-Argilaga 《Quality and Quantity》2007,41(1):93-104
We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social,
16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate
and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations.
However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the
analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed.
This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential
analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained
a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed. 相似文献
158.
Vanthuan Nguyen Bonnie F. Van Ness Robert R. Van Ness 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2007,31(2):251-267
We examine how the different mix of informed and liquidity trading in the market for ETFs affects the nature of inter-market
competition. We find that both the characteristics of the securities and the structures of the competing markets jointly determine
the nature of inter-market competition. Given the superior execution quality on the ECNs and the low adverse selection costs
in the ETF market, anonymous market such as the ECNs, attract both liquidity and informed traders. We also find that markets
compete in a subset of ETFs. In addition, we find that quotebased competition is prevalent in the market for ETFs. 相似文献
159.
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal.
We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that
candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium
to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure
alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election.
In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative
will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible
in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington,
Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson,
Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial
support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at
Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality
is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
160.