Additive and Multiplicative Uncertainty Revisited: What Explains the Contrasting Biases?

above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models is more realistic. Received December 14, 2001; revised version received July 16, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We thank referees for helpful comments. Ciaran Driver would like to acknowledge the research facilities from ANU, Canberra for their help in writing this paper.     

iTV: A major opportunity for financial services,or not?

Interactive television has arrived, thanks to substantial technology investments that have been made by Sky and others. It is growing in importance as innovative interactive applications are developed for broadcast programmes (eg the BBCi service and Big Brother), and for advertising — and will develop further when broadband deployment gets to critical mass. Readers should not expect a television-variant of the world wide web, however. This was tried during 2000–2002 in the form of web look-alike, interactive ‘walled garden’ sites, and failed to attract critical mass footfall. The model has evolved and now revolves around interactive content synchronised with broadcast, which offers financial services companies an interesting new way to increase awareness and to differentiate the service presentation. Furthermore, over the next ten years, broadband is expected to usher in a new era of personalised television — in which specialised broadcasts (such as personal pensions advice programmes) can be made available on demand. The observations in this paper are mainly drawn from the UK, where digital television penetration is high; the lessons can be applied more broadly, however, and are relevant to any organisation thinking of promoting its service through entertainment channels.     

The value of tax benefits and the cost of liquidating versus selling failed thrift institutions

This paper examines the 205 insolvent thrifts that were resolved in 1988 and assesses the cost savings obtained by selling 179 of the institutions through assisted acquisitions rather than liquidating them. It is hypothesized that the cost savings were determined by factors related both to the future viability of the acquired institution and the particulars of the deal arranged by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The added value by selling a thrift is determined primarily by the level of core deposits obtained by the acquired thrift. However, the branch structure and purchased mortgage-servicing rights should also add franchise value to the firm. In addition to these factors, the analysis accounts for the tax benefits and other regulator forbearances associated with the deals. Other characteristics of the deals are also considered. It is found that core deposits, tax benefits, purchased mortgage-servicing rights, average branch size, and type of acquirer, as well as some other factors, were significant determinants of the cost savings obtained through selling an institution rather than liquidating it.